Charlie Hebdo, Security and the MCB 
It is a self-evident fact that the twelve murders at the offices of 'Charlie Hebdo' today are an act of mind-numbing barbarity. It is awkward for the MCB that news of the attack coincided with the MCB's press release "Confront terrorism by backing freedom: ... re-think the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill." Nevertheless, this message from the MCB is right, and the attack on Charlie Hebdo is an attack on freedom, which must be countered by endorsing freedom.

Firstly, on the murders: Throughout the period of his life in Makkah following the first revelations of the Qur'an when he was forty, through to the divine command for him to flee Makkah a dozen years later, the Messenger of Allah (S) sustained continual abuse, defamation, ridicule, violence against him and his followers, isolation and deprivation that caused the death of his deeply loved first wife Khadija (R) in the 'year of sorrows'. Yet in all that time he never allowed any of his followers to raise their hand against the enemies of Islam. Even later, in Madinah, no move was taken against the torture and murder of Muslims held captive remaining in Makkah, instead insisting that the Muslims of Madinah would stand rigidly by the horribly one-sided treaty they agreed with the Makkans. The battles that took place between them were all exclusively in the defence of Madinah, and the final victory over Makkah was a bloodless and overwhelming victory brought about by the Makkans' own machinations.

The point is, simply, that whatever satirists do to mock Muslims, the Qur'an, or the Messenger of Allah (S), we should be content that they are free to do so. One juvenile mocked the Messenger's mannerisms to his face. He gently placed his finger on the boy's chest over his heart, said a few words to him, and left him. The boy in due course became a great Sahabah, his heart constantly in the dhikr of Allah. If no one learns anything else from the cartoons saga, they will at least be aware that the Messenger of Allah was distinguished by his preference for white clothes, his full beard and his habitual imamah, turban. It really does take harpies to remind us Muslims of these basic sunnahs!

Now back to the MCB and the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill. The MCB's press release quite rightly ridicules the government's proposed measures to require providers of public services to monitor and detect signs of extremism and potential terrorism: something that politicians themselves are completely incapable of doing, and for which the security authorities have only achieved through applying mind-boggling resources. However, none of this should be necessary in the first place if it were not for the fact that Muslims themselves, and especially Muslim institutions, have so far utterly failed to tackle the problem. Today a dozen people in Paris have paid with their lives. But over the last fifteen years, so have hundreds of people in or from Britain have too, our own neighbours, friends and relatives, in the 9/11 catastrophe, the 7/7 disaster, and elsewhere overseas. Hundreds of members of UK Muslim families are incarcerated on terrorism offences. Yet there is barely a ripple of change in UK masjids - the same divisive, sectarian rhetoric or vacuous homilies from imams; the same impenetrably exclusive management committees, and the same ranks of dissatisfied dissenters. The same stories of unfulfilled converts to Islam, and returning youth, drawn in frustration to the margins where they find extremist notions meshing with their own experiences. The same selfish, incompetent and inept dealings by Muslims with their neighbours, around masjids and everywhere else. Not a single indigenous imam in a single UK masjid after three amply supplied generations - even where the imam speaks some English, it is embarrassing to listen to. There is hardly a single imam who is even capable of explaining intellectually what is wrong with ISIS or Al Qaida. The MCB has done nothing to change any of this, nor has MINAB, nor has any other umbrella body.

All the same, Muslims are not alone in the blame for this failure to tackle extremism. They have been rendered into a state of fear by sensationalist media and by draconian criminal sanctions - even against those such as the Nottingham University academics legitimately studying the material - so there are real government obstacles to actually confronting extremists, compounded by ignorance by security operatives, politicians and the media of what actually constitutes extremism. But until Muslim institutions pull their collective heads out of the sand, confront their own internal, sectarian and exclusivist problems, and actually start to tackle extremism and its causes (intolerance) within the Muslim community, they cannot expect anything different from a government that cannot indulge liberal thinking and liberal values.

Muslims should expect ridicule, expect satire, it is part of the currency of freedom of expression and freedom of religion. We should not be in the least fazed by it, nor do we need to repay its cruel barbs. What we have to do, to blunt its point, is to render it meaningless through our own exemplary conduct according to the Sunnah. Ironically, to be mocked and ridiculed, is itself a sunnah of the Messenger of Allah (S). The murderers of "Charlie Hebdo" have less understanding of the Sunnah, indeed of Islam, than the cartoonists who caricatured the Messenger of Allah (S) in his own Sunnah.

Wa'al akhir ud-dawana an-alhamdulillahi rabbil aalameen

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The Times: Out-of-touch imams can't halt terrorism, says advisor 
On 25th August I responded to an inquiry about UK Muslims and ISIS, from Laura Pitel, Political Correspondent at The Times. This resulted in a news article yesterday, 8th September, which used some of the material, but lacked any detail required to put in context of practical action. While what was published suggested I recommended a very liberal approach; my argument isn't liberalism for its own sake but for the sake of containment of the problems in a visible, identifiable space, at the same time forcing Muslim institutions to recognise their responsibilities and own up to their failings.

Laura Pitel, The Times: Can we talk about the police and government response to Britons going to join Isis?
MiB.org: ISIS is of course a very topical subject, and one for which the landscape is evolving rapidly. It is clear to me that the current haemorrhage of militants and their protégés from the UK into Syria and Iraq demonstrates a substantial failure of the last ten years of PREVENT, legislation, and indeed Muslim community actions, to curb Muslim militants.

ISIS is exactly what armchair militants have been rooting for, ever since Shi'as seized the initiative and woke Sunnis up with Khomeini's revolution in 1979: it is in the right place - a threat to Israel (perfectly timed, with the gut-wrenching bloodshed of the latter's onslaught against Gaza), to 'decadent' Europe's [and NATO’s] borders, to the 'upstart' Shi'as, and (probably most overlooked because of analysts' presumption of so-called "Wahhabi" backing) an existential threat to Saudi Arabia itself. (I rather suspect many armchair militants are secretly hoping ISIS will evaporate before their own bluffs are called and their protégés press them to put their feet where their rhetoric is.) Whether the proper government response should be more proscription, legislation and harsher penalties, or something more liberal and indulgent is beside the point. There is a movement stirring that will continue to draw militant Muslims from the UK even if it is eventually destroyed in Syria and Iraq, and it won't be simply destroyed there, because it consists of many people from the region who see it as a deliverance, as the Taliban were seen at an early stage, to be a deliverance from the internecine war between mujahideen fighters after the fall of Najibullah and the Soviets.

The suggested responses currently being mooted by politicians are unlikely to have any de-motivating effect on those motivated to go: threat of loss of UK citizenship is of trivial significance to anyone embracing the apocalyptic vision of the return of the Khilafa and the opportunity to punch back at the perceived global enemies of what they see as a revitalised, muscular and purified Islam. Likewise few who depart under such circumstances would give much thought to the tribulations of the UK's criminal justice system were they ever to return. Kashmir, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Chechnia spawned numbers of peripatetic militants, and whatever happens to ISIS, there will now be significantly greater numbers drifting around. [Since this was written, Peter Neumann’s ISCR has identified numbers of disillusioned people from the UK seeking a return. ISCR rightly states that they provide a potential rich resource of credible counter-radicalisation advocates.]

Calls for proscription of militant organisations in the UK presuppose that such entities are structured and organised - they are not, they are as amorphous and anarchic as any bunch of young men with aggrandised egos and autodidactic, Millenarianist theology can make them. Broadening the scope of proscription to include organisations such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir UK, is injudicious because HT, in particular, provides an irreplaceable lightning rod for idealist, intellectual Muslims to work out all the complexities of what it really takes to institute a workable political system, in public forums and on the public street, in plain view of plain-clothes Plod - the perfect antidote to any supposed conveyor belt into militancy. (Where would the rest of us be now without our own opportunities to thrash out Marx and Kropotkin in the Students Union?) [HT in particular have maintained a long-running intellectual campaign around the return of the Khilafa, and ISIS provides precisely what is required for HT to be forced to refine their doctrines to demonstrate how they would avoid such an abomination. Banning also feeds the temptation of ‘forbidden fruit’ and bolsters the militant credentials of otherwise-not-actually-very-militant bands. It also legitimises an otherwise absent grievance about Government criminalising Muslims oppressively, denying freedom of speech and freedom of association partially and injudiciously.]

Calls for curtailing extremist preachers face even tougher challenges - they are and always have been almost impossible to find in the UK's timorous and deferential mosques and its barely articulate (in English) imams who are employed by mosque management committees to make sure they don't step outside of a line drawn around the village politics of the clan in Mirpur, Jhelum, Sylhet or Surat from which their employers are, typically, exclusively drawn from. The few speakers and imams that make the headlines and exposés, were there, such as Abu Hamza, because the management committee [in that instance, of Finsbury Park Mosque] ran out of village imams to bring over, or they epitomise the worst of gratuitous, juvenile, anti-Semitic racism or of corporal child abuse, that exists endemic and unchallenged in the first and second generations of Asian Muslims. The latter are the very same ones who will stress how their particular mosque is a bastion against the 'extremism' that turns out to be nothing more than the doctrinal difference they have with their rival neighbouring mosque, Bareilvi briefing against Deobandi, Deobandi briefing against Bareilvi, and both camps utterly perplexed when it turns out that it is their own children who have turned to violent militancy.

On-line curbs face the inevitable obfuscation that faces any attempt at circumscribing publication in the media - once it has been recorded and made available in public, the more heavily it is suppressed, the more it gains traction through Samizdat routes or simply through myth-enhancing notoriety while remaining unread.

One immediate consequence of lock-down policies is that the already poorly informed religious scholars and community debaters are denied access to the very things and people they need to rehearse their arguments against. Fear of the authorities and media hounds, fear of sanctions against the community itself, simmering Islamophobic racism all push the topic of militant extremism right off the small list of safe topics imams and others are prepared to discuss, and the problem stays deep underground from Muslim institutions in the UK.

The problem is that the pattern of dysfunctionality among UK Muslims was cast three, four and five decades ago. While mosque building has continued apace, investment in capable imams and representatives, and capacity building among them, is almost non-existent. Even the relatively highly organised Deobandi seminaries place very few of their graduates in influential positions in mosques, because most mosques can't afford to pay a UK-standard living wage and instead recruit, nepotistically, someone who is inextricably tied into their own clan, willing to sleep in a makeshift room in the ramshackle two-up-two-down, grandly titled Bogglethwaite Central Mosque, and work for a small fortune only as measured in rupees. Such imams, typical of UK mosques, know nothing much of ISIS, would struggle to find Syria on a map, communicate to the community's youth in mother tongue or cringingly bad English, and are equipped only to argue out the Bareilvi versus Deobandi squabble of the mid-nineteenth century.

Muslim youth for their part, and the steady trickle of Muslim converts, equally significantly, are left entirely to their own devices when their euphoric religious awakening hits them, at the age when they are striving for an identity of their own. The most practical path for them to follow is that of the new Salafi movements. If they are fortunate enough to live in a neighbourhood where sufficient of the community have broken away from traditional allegiances to set up their own Salafi-inclined mosque and staff it (about a hundred such in the UK), or to enroll in a university with an active Salafi presence on campus - most universities - they will gain access to eloquently written and well produced descriptions of a version of orthodox Islam that is coherent, accessible and, most importantly for rebellious youth, anathema to the old school rival orthodoxies of Deoband and Bareilli madressahs. [I am far from being an advocate for Salafi interpretations of Islam, but am keen to impress the message that Salaf-ism is not of itself militant and is often the most engaged strand of Islam in UK society – it is vehemently opposed to the strands of Islam I espouse.] If they are unlucky, they may get a half-baked version of Salafism that gives them the supposed authority to conjure up their own interpretations and bibliomancy 'proofs' from Islamic scriptures. With no local Salafi institution to turn to, the more outspoken and egotistical among them will meld such homegrown philosophising with snippets of on-line web-board debate and emotive newsreel clips, with which to cultivate a determination to become the next great reviver of Islam. Youthful imaginations use such stuff to place themselves at the heart of an imagined world-changing secret conspiracy. This is the nature of self-radicalisation and it is desperately normal. For most, a comfy chair, the awe of their less well read friends, and a wireless internet connection are all they actually want. For some, put on the spot by their own egos, or their mates, or by rivals to the claim of most outspoken dissident in the community, or for the convert, driven by the aphoristic zeal of the convert, there is an awakening of the desire to act. Such is not the kind of stuff governments can legislate against or punish pre-emptively, or even predict, since they occur outside of established institutions and often in secret defiance of them. ISIS beckons.

My pen-sketch makes play on specific entities, Salafi, Deobandi, Bareilvi mosques, but these are not the source of any kind of radicalisation. The problem is, these are the very last places where extremism is debated, indeed where any kind of dissent is debated. They are the only institutions of any consequence that UK Muslims possess, so instead, perhaps counter-intuitively, these are the places where extremism should be debated and examined. But there are some fundamental problems to solve first. Firstly, mosques managed by one doctrinal faction or ethnic division, have good reason to be wary of dissenters whose ambition is to supplant management with a rival faction. Instead, tolerance, mutual respect and mutual understanding of alternative factions are all required, so that diversionary arguments that are currently widespread, can be put aside. (Bareilvis habitually claim that Salafi or Deobandi doctrines are the root of extremism; Salafis claim that Deobandis and Bareilvis have corrupted the sources of Islam; and Deobandis describe Bareilvis as polytheists and Salafis as without authority. All three post takfir against each other, against Shi'a and against pretty much any other form of 'deviancy'. Such a mutually poisonous atmosphere prevents meaningful debate about different doctrines from taking place.)

Secondly, mosques require completely open and transparent access to competent, stable and accountable managements - the secrecy and self-referential management that mosque managements currently use to protect themselves against rival takeover bids, prevents them from addressing dissenters' criticisms and allowing open and informed discussions. More importantly, it also therefore prevents them from identifying and engaging with dissenters who are being attracted, from whichever quarter, by militant rhetoric. And even more importantly, they cannot distinguish perfectly respectable dissenters and dissenters toying with extreme ideas, from those who are actively planning political violence, since any form of dissent is pushed out of sight of mosque imams, managements and responsible authorities.

Thirdly, none of the needed openness can happen in an atmosphere of fear of government, police, the press and the mob, and fear for the consequences for family members who are implicated in extremism. Criminality must of course be countered properly through judicial process, but it is horribly clear that politicians, police, the press and the mob cannot distinguish between behaviour that is a throwback to the Islam of migrants' home villages, activity that is the drama of furtive, exploring, young intemperates, and calculated attempts to threaten society with political violence. Bundling all these motivations together instead, has the consequence that disaffected Muslims on the margins of the Muslim community are further disengaged (potentially hanged for a sheep while snaring a rabbit) and pose a greater threat that is harder to identify. It has the consequence also of steadily increasing the prison population with a growing network of people who have been explicitly removed and who are therefore even more of a potent threat with less to lose, on their eventual release, indelibly labelled as 'terrorists'. And it gives those who choose to migrate to the new khalifa of Shams, a strong 'push' motive to reinforce their ideological 'pull'. When Osama bin Laden set in motion the 9/11 attacks, one of his core aims, in common with all asymmetric warfare strategies, was to undermine the comfortable settlement of Muslims in the West, of unleashing consequences that would drive capable and sophisticated Muslims back to an Islamic homeland that militants would rule over. Whatever differences exist between al Qaida and ISIS, that retrograde process is well underway.

The government must recognise that Muslim community institutions are very largely dysfunctional, but that there is no top-down solution to make them work - they are all local, self-governing and jealously independent of each other. Help is needed to make them functional, and only then will they be able to begin to address radicalisation among their own families. Help has very little to do with money and nothing to do with legislation, it is about inculcating tolerance and mutual respect among Muslims with differing flavours of the faith, about accountability for access to community resources, about cultivating rhetorical skills in English, and especially about gaining authoritative Islamic knowledge of the nature and substance of militant movements and arguments and then most of all, using that knowledge in open, multi-sided forum to draw would-be militants into challengeable debate, so that their potential followers can be challenged and can be given the tools to resist what are currently very tempting arguments. Right now the Muslim community has numerous leaders, but none of them has any following. Whatever any of them may say to discourage would-be ISIS recruits, no one is actually listening.

Laura Pitel, The Times: What, in your view is the way to address the issue you set out about the management of mosques? Minab - which was ostensibly set up for that purpose - has fallen out with the coalition and now has almost no contact with government. They had been pressured to cut ties with certain (unspecified) groups and were not comfortable about doing so. Do you have a view on Minab?

MiB.org: MINAB is a typically top-down, enthusiast-led and therefore largely self-referential entity with negligible influence over the affairs of any mosque - even its affiliation requirements are the lightest possible touch, along the lines of "aspires to adhere to at least one of the (five) principles that MINAB espouses". It has no means of cajoling any mosque to progress, and does not even whisper about the cultural, ethnic and doctrinal sectarianism that sets mosques against each other and mosque managements against significant slices of their congregations. Nevertheless it is right that it should not cut links with any entity that is providing mosque-like facilities in the UK; pressure to do so comes from people who have not troubled to recognise that the problematic issues they associate with some groups, such as the dozen Ikhwaan-backed mosques associated with the Muslim Association of Britain, are not confined to explicit groups but are diffused throughout the Muslim community.

I have stressed already that remedial action cannot be top-down or under duress, it has to come from the grass roots and must not threaten the stability of mosque management even though mosque managements are at the heart of the problem. (When mosque managements get destabilised or become unviable, they immediately become vulnerable to eclectic and extremist groups, exactly as happened at Finsbury Park; as threatened to happen in Brixton at a similar point in time, and in a very few other cases). I have suggested in some detail the kind of steps that can be taken on my website, at
http://politics.muslimsinbritain.org/politics2.html#3
but they require mosque managements to recognise their deficiencies, for a concerted campaign in the mosque and its neighbourhood to promote mutual tolerance of rival factions, co-opting influential alims (scholars) where necessary, a controlled programme to open up the mosque's resources to plural doctrines, refreshing the mosque's management with capable organisers who are committed to transparency and plurality, access for imams and other interested people to authoritative Islamic and political analysis of controversial and extremist doctrines, introduction of open debate in local forums to address such issues, co-option of disengaged and marginalised dissenters into mosque activities, co-option of key figures from the authorities into the now opened up environment and exposure to them and the Muslim participants of the kind of debate that is currently the exclusive and one-sided preserve of militants. In a nutshell what is required is the normalisation of dissent and pluralism, so that extremist narratives can be challenged and counter-narratives can be exercised. Government, legislation and the police cannot do that.

Laura Pitel, The Times: Secondly (and forgive me if this question sounds rude), but how would you position yourself in the context of Muslim groups in Britain? Innes [Bowen, in her recent book “Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent”] discusses the difficulties for policy makers and the media of understanding how legitimate and representative one group or individual maybe versus another. On what experiences/connections do you base your opinions and how much weight do you believe you carry among different Muslim groups?

MiB.org: I and the MuslimsInBritain.org website are vigorously independent of any Muslim community entities; I am a lone operator, I make no claim whatsoever to be a representative or community leader. There are many mosque committees who are unpleased by the analyses I present and by the systematic way in which I identify their mosques' doctrinal and ethnic allegiances. On the other hand there are thousands of Muslims who visit my website for the very same directory information, returning frequently. During Ramadhaan and Eid-ul-Adha, these numbers peak at around 165,000 unique visitors per month, a substantial portion of the UK Muslim community. In short I carry negligible weight among Muslim groups and have no ambition to be otherwise, and have substantial weight among ordinary Muslims as well as considerable respect among researchers and investigators.

Laura Pitel, The Times: Can you tell me, what is your current role with regards to the police and/or the government?
MiB.org: My participation in counter-radicalisation discussion and my MuslimsInBritain.org website are activities I have pursued in my own time, and which have attracted the interest of some government officials and police forces through mutual associates and by reputation. They are not connected with my professional circumstances.

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A Government approved version of Islam? 
In today's Times, MPs Hazel Blears and Julian Lewis, both members of the Commons Security Committee, placed an editorial which expressed the need to address a number of issues to counter Muslim extremism. In such a medium, the detail necessarily absent, and indeed suggested that the details were yet to be formulated. However there was one glaring suggestion that would not only kill any Muslim support for the initiative from the outset, but which would be likely to be substantially more dangerous than doing nothing at all. They proposed that a single, safe and acceptable version of Islam be promoted.

Ms Blears, if you have again been approached by advocates of some of the mill town Bareilvi mosques with the notion that their version of Islam is the sole purveyor of integrated, inclusive and acceptable Islam, please be warned, nothing could be further from the truth. Three of the four 7/7 bombers came from nice, respectable, Bareilvi-aligned Pakistani families, the other was a convert. Bareilvis do not promote violence, at least not in the UK, and as long as you discount the Bradford book burnings that kicked off the Rushdie affair. But they run the most schismatic and exclusive mosque managements, follow the most impenetrable doctrines, have the most corporal child abusive madressahs, the least communicative (in English) imams, and generally do more than any other subset of British Islam to alienate their own offspring. New converts to Islam approach Bareilvi masjids for help, and leave rapidly, shaking their heads in bewilderment. Nearly all incidents of Muslim violent extremism in or from the UK have involved one or two converts. Most have involved the offspring of Bareilvi families - Tel Aviv, 7/7, High Wycombe.

I should explain the basis on which I make the presumption about Hazel Blears' Bareilvi briefing. Some time ago I was one of a number of carefully selected delegates to a meeting that as we learnt part way through, was orchestrated to set up what became the Sufi Muslim Council. I was invited because my Sufi credentials and possibly also my substantial Bareilvi credentials, appeared to mesh with my counter-extremism credentials and meet the organiser's desire to achieve unified support for his proposed SMC. The organiser was Haras Rafiq, a Rochdale protege of Hazel Blears, and her name was cited by the hosts as well, to lend authority to the proceedings - she was a Blair minister at the time and Rafiq now draws a retainer through Quilliam. I don't actually know why I wasn't invited to the following meeting (I wasn't the only one), but that was the launch of the SMC, and pretty much its wake as well, apart from the website which lingered untouched for a couple of years. I have never, in spite of my extensive research into such matters, been able to identify any mosque that actually affiliated with the SMC, even though I knew many of the two dozen worthy delegates to that first meeting, and I doubt that now Ms Blears and Dr Lewis are advocating a repeat of Haris Rafiq's misguided initiative. Don't be fooled into allowing government policy to be hijacked to become the proxy for Bareilvi factionalists to continue their mid-nineteenth century feud with Deoband and everyone else - they have nothing at all to offer counter-extremism.

But be warned, whichever brand of Islam you pick to be the acceptable face, it will be a poisoned chalice. Nobody wants to be the face of UK Government's acceptable Islam when there is so much to complain about. In fact, such a policy would be the mirror image of the Takfir of the extremists; it plays on the hadith on firqas in just the same way: "My ummah (followers, community) will divide into seventy three sects and all but one will be in the hellfire. The one will be the people of my Sunnah (practice, way of life) and (that of) my Companions." There is hardly a Bareilvi imam in the country who isn't paid by his management committee explicitly to pronounce takfir against Deobandis, Salafis, Shi'as, so-called Wahhabis, even other Sufis that challenge them.

They are not alone in such schismatism, of course, but they are the most vituperative. What is really needed, is what has been advocated over and over in these pages: Accountable mosques with plural congregations, mutual respect for differing firqas, informed and intelligent, multi-party debate, indigenous imams, and the opportunity for those tempted by extremism to have such matters analysed, dissected and countered in an objective, undoctrinal way by people who know what they are talking about. None of these things are currently possible.

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A radical proposal to involve youth in the Masjid 
A radical proposal to involve youth in the Masjid


Much of what I have written on this site and elsewhere has been about opening up the masjid to make it plural across Muslim factions, accountable and transparently managed. While there is wide consensus that there is a pressing need to draw youth into involvement in the masjid and that barriers to this are a recurring complaint, the advice I have offered about plurality, accountability and mutual respect do not actually do anything specific to draw youth back in. So here is an idea:

Set up a youth committee - ok, nothing original there. Make it a complete replica of the positions and responsibilities of the existing committee, warts and all. Make it elected ( - ok that will be a bit of a shock for many masjids), using a broad franchise, not with narrow and exclusive electoral membership.

*** All candidates and voters must be under twenty years old however. ***

Let the surrogate committee run for one year terms and give it a budget for spending over which it can have full control. (It will have its own treasurer and fundraising appointees anyway probably, and should be able to do its own fundraising.)

Let it have its own slot for activities and events in or on behalf of the masjid, and do not place any constraints on what they should be - trust the youth with responsibility to maintain the integrity of the masjid: don't have the conceit to think you, incumbent management, have behaved more responsibly than them, you almost certainly haven't.

Eleven months into the one year term of office, step aside. Give the now well settled-in youth committee one month in which they are in total control of the month's finance, management and running of the masjid, including paying the imam and madrassah teachers, and selecting their own preferred imam to stand in, in place if they wish (give your imam a holiday!). (Obviously theer are not likely to be many options for an imam to be in a paid post for just a month, so let the youth committee work something out for themselves.

At the end of that month, require the entire youth committee to stand down in favour of a new elected youth committee, and be ineligible to stand again until a further year has passed.

Obviously the young people who are willing to get involved in this way, will, for the most part, be fully ensconced in the ways of the masjid already, and you will probably want to spend a lot of time trying to influence them to make sure that the decisions they make are ones that don't discomfort you. But that is no small part of the point - you, incumbent management, will now have to take time to justify and explain your behaviour and choices to teenagers, probably for the first time in your own life!

Also, though the participating youth may be part of the masjid's own establishment, they mix with many who won't be, and they will need to canvass for support. Thuswise they will draw in their peers who are less well established. It probably won't reach right out to the disaffected margins, but it will be a huge improvement on the outreach you are doing, which is probably nothing whatsoever.

Give it a try, anything is better than the way things are now!

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Letter to New Scientist 
I wrote a letter to New Scientist in response to an article published by ICSR's head, Prof Peter Neumann. They were kind enough to publish it, but inevitably edited it down and lost some vital meaning. Here is the full text:

Reference - Spotting the Threat, 5 July 2014, Issue 2976 Page 24

Dear Sir

Peter Neumann (Spotting the Threat, 5 July 2014) is right to qualify the threat posed by jihadis returning from Syria: their motives are quite distinct from those who attempt terrorist activity within the UK. However all such returnees do have one very significant impact on return: their kudos, their credibility among their peers, is massively increased due to their presumed self-sacrifice. The effect of this is two-fold - it encourages like-minded persons to pick the same path unless they can be discouraged as Peter suggested, but more significantly, it induces individuals jealous of their new status, to outdo them in impact. In short, stay-at-home militant rivals become more inclined to commit domestic terrorism due to the catalyst effect of the returnee.

The evidence for this is the strong parallel in what we have seen over the last decade, that almost all UK Muslims involved in domestic terrorist cases include one or two converts to Islam. Not only are some converts overtaken with their own zeal, but they have a distinct raised status among their born-Muslim peers as well. Muslim communities and mosques throughout the UK, totally fail to address the needs of those entering Islam because they are hidebound by the desire to preserve each one's own doctrinal and ethnic exclusivity. This fails to meet converts' needs, nor the needs of their own youth, so both become entangled in marginal and often attractively militant alternatives that persist below the narrow gaze of factional mosque and community leaders. Occasionally one such alternative spawns a terrorist plot, usually right under the noses of their elders. Furthermore, government policy, legislation and populist media's hyperbolic outrage all make it impossible to have reasoned dialogue with returnees or other militant dissenters without dire consequences for participants. So, sadly, Peter's hope that community leaders can rise to the challenge, is misplaced. Just as the UK's Muslim 'establishment' fails to address the needs of disaffected converts, so it will fail to bring returning jihadis back into the fold.

Instead, the vicious circle of exclusive mosque management, intolerance of rival factions, dissenters driven underground, and fear of open debate all conspire to push would-be jihadis and domestic terrorists alike, out of sight. All four spokes of this circle must be broken before the domestic or returnee threat can be countered successfully.

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