3 Co-ordinated Strategy for PREVENT
This section is still very much under development; please return again for updates or contact the site directly for more information.Meanwhile, the following are some relevant notes:
Identifier 1. Conflict-specialist academics |
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Proposed
Activity Programmes of speakers who
are authorities on modern history and ethnography of countries such as |
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Purpose Undermining of case for
extremism. Intellectual capacity-building. |
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Source PPS |
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Rationale Militant idealism provides a simple dichotomy of righteous jihadis against evil imperialists. Actual picture is invariably more complex. Better understanding diminishes appeal of militant cause, equips moderates with counter-arguments, does not diminish validity of the cause. |
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Definable
success criteria Improved standard of
debate from Muslim contributors. Willingness of moderate
Muslims to be able to mount cogent head-on debates with those taking a
pro-militant position. (‘Willingness’, not necessarily actual
debates – this is a capacity-building measure.) Seminal relevant articles
in Muslim journals. |
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Primarily
Responsible
|
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Identifiable
Obstacles Willingness of
authoritative speakers to involve themselves in low-status, high frequency events. Willingness of
sufficiently active Muslims to accept, receive and digest the authority and
content of the learned speakers. |
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Secondary
actions to overcome obstacles Government funding of fees University extra-mural
organisation Lecture circuits to
include a thousand small masjids |
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Model None |
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Evidence
of Progress None |
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Summary
of Progress Evidence Sources None |
Identifier 2. Awareness of third-world issues. |
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Proposed
Activity More involvement in and information
about practical action such as relief work and development aid. |
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Purpose Normalisation of fringe
activities / isolation of extremist activities. Undermining of case for
extremism. |
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Source PPS |
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Rationale Involvement in cross-sector, cross-agency campaigns to alleviate poverty and injustice brings Muslim youth into productive, co-operative relationships with non-Muslims with similar concerns. Focus on practical issues to address poverty, malnutrition, illiteracy, water shortage, etc challenges the idea that political (Islamic) solutions will solve these problems and posits that they may instead exacerbate the problems caused by strife. Practical activity to find solutions, is a more fundamental religious virtue. |
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Definable
success criteria Specific sections of
recognised Muslim and non-Muslim charitable aid agencies devoted to this kind
of inclusion. Youth involved in such
work willing and equipped to promote it, its material benefits and its value
in contrast to the suffering of violent conflict. Shift towards considered
debate amongst youth on poverty and injustice in poorer Muslim countries. |
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Primarily
Responsible
|
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Identifiable
Obstacles Resources of Muslim aid
agencies are very limited. Counter-argument that this
approach is merely papering over the symptoms, that the fundamental problems
lie in un-Islamic political structures. NB Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen, the Muslim Brotherhood, is hugely engaged in
social welfare programmes in |
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Secondary
actions to overcome obstacles Graduate the programme
according to experience and maturity of participants. Interconnect Government,
NGO and Muslim agencies to create a common programme identity. |
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Model None |
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Evidence
of Progress None |
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Summary
of Progress Evidence Sources None |
Identifier 3. Practical action against poverty |
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Proposed
Activity Opportunities for young
Muslims to make short trips to Muslim countries under recognised government
or Islamic aid programmes, e.g. during university vacations. Wider programme to provide
extended volunteer programmes along the lines of VSO. |
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Purpose Normalisation of fringe
activities / isolation of extremist activities. Undermining of case for
extremism. |
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Source PPS |
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Rationale Giving youth constructive experiences of the realities of exposure to realities of poverty and deprivation in third-world countries and the opportunity to do practical things to help, will demonstrate the banality and basic materialistic needs of deprived people. This causes idealistic notions of fighting oppression to be replaced by actual experience of real on-the-ground needs and help. |
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Definable
success criteria Involvement of Muslim
youth in defined programmes of overseas development aid and in its support
and campaigning in Specific sections of
recognised Muslim and non-Muslim charitable aid agencies devoted to this kind
of inclusion. Youth involved in such
work willing and equipped to promote it, its material benefits and its value
in contrast to the suffering of violent conflict. Shift towards considered
debate amongst youth on poverty and injustice in poorer Muslim countries. |
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Primarily
Responsible
|
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Identifiable
Obstacles Resources of Muslim aid
agencies are very limited. The closer such work is to
areas of upheaval, the more effective it will be, but the more problematic it
will be in terms of personal safety and political controversy. |
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Secondary
actions to overcome obstacles Graduate the programme to
bring it gently closer to areas of upheaval.
Graduate it according to
experience and maturity of participants. Interconnect Government,
NGO and Muslim agencies to create a common programme identity. |
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Model Catholic Institute for
International Relations (CIIR) is a useful model that shows (i) involvement
of explicitly religious bodies in volunteering (you don’t have to be a
Catholic to volunteer for CIIR); sophisticated volunteering programme;
continuum across campaigning, volunteering and lobbying. |
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Evidence
of Progress None |
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Summary
of Progress Evidence Sources None |
Identifier 4. Grass Roots Leadership |
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Proposed
Activity Steps to involve practical, grass roots
Muslims in representing the Muslim community. (PPS) Opportunities for young British Muslims to be leaders and active
citizens – UK Youth Parliament to train Muslim youth MPs to be peer
facilitators and run debates/consultations with young Muslims in their local
communities. (PET Recommendation 2) |
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Purpose Normalisation of fringe
activities / isolation of extremist activities. Better engagement and
mutual understanding. Intellectual capacity-building. |
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Source PPS PET |
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Rationale Muslim community is very
self-conscious of its public face, and masjid committees especially so. Imams, masjid committee members, are
invariably naïve and inarticulate.
Community organisation leaders and party politicians are ignorant of
practice, of masjids, of youth issues, of Islamic doctrines, and pursue some
pretty off-the-wall notions of these.
Involvement of practising, involved, aware Muslims brings them into
the limelight where they have to learn to take responsibility for their views
and statements. Involvement of them
also creates points of contact around which dialogue can be constructed and
wider engagement on both sides achieved. |
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Definable
success criteria Practising Muslim stereotypes
take on positive roles in representing the Muslim community and take over
from party apparatchiks, curmudgeonly ‘village’ elders, rich businessmen and
other out-of-touch grandees. Strong debate about
whether mosque-attendees or fashion-conscious, street-wise youth are better
representatives of the Muslim (religious) community. |
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Primarily
Responsible
|
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Identifiable
Obstacles Runs counter to the vested
interests of all established Muslim community bodies, local and national. Masjid committees suffocate
attempts by people not totally under their control to represent them or use
the masjid for meetings etc. Opening up access to
representation, control and influence will open up delicate structures to
factional rivalry, instability and potentially exploitation by extremists. |
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Secondary
actions to overcome obstacles Clear backing of the
authorities will put off strongly anti-establishment factions as
participants. Creation of useful and
influential links into local government and policing will encourage old-guard
Muslim establishment to give participants influence as they in turn try to
co-opt participants into the local Muslim community’s status quo. |
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Model None |
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Evidence
of Progress http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/bradford/5149768.stm:
|
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Summary
of Progress Evidence Sources None |
Identifier 5. Prominence of converts |
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Proposed
Activity Involvement of converts in more prominent roles in the Muslim community, not just special cases already prominent because of their fame. |
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Purpose Better engagement and
mutual understanding. Undermining of case for
extremism. |
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Source PPS |
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Rationale Competent converts to
Islam have a very important role to play, even though it is obstructed by
traditional ethnic communities. They
are free of the distorted view of Western society and ethnocentric views of
Muslim society that many first and second generation migrant Muslims
have. They can demonstrate meeting the
aspirations of the upcoming generation in taking an active part in society
and the workplace without the ethnic community’s collective chip on its
shoulder. And converts could be a
visible demonstration to outside militants, terrorists, and racialists and
xenophobes too, that Islam has a non-negotiable stake in British society that
cannot be undermined by political violence. |
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Definable
success criteria Recognition of Islam as part
of indigenous social fabric. Acknowledgement of
contributions of |
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Primarily
Responsible
|
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Identifiable
Obstacles 1.
Many converts are attracted by the radical causes célèbres of militancy – converts’
exuberance, zealousness and lack of a constituency to be responsible to, could
be destabilising. 2.
Presentable neophyte converts are rightly
reluctant to take prominent roles. 3.
Inertia of most Muslim organisations, especially
small local masjids, set up as private ethnic
not religious resources. 4.
Ignorance and wariness of converts’ attitudes,
leanings and long term commitment among conservative and cautious ethnic
communities. 5.
On account of the point above, the absence of a
dependable and faction-free forum or support-base from which converts can
have a platform. |
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Secondary
actions to overcome obstacles Overt encouragement by
official bodies, of converts as representatives. |
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Model None |
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Evidence
of Progress 3 notable converts on Home
Office task force (70 total) |
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Summary
of Progress Evidence Sources None |
Identifier 6.
Access to the |
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Proposed
Activity Muslim community access to the less well understood instruments of security – demystifying the secret agencies. |
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Purpose Better engagement and
mutual understanding. Undermining of case for
extremism. |
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Source PPS |
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Rationale While SB, CTC, SS, SIS, JTAC etc remain anonymous and mysterious, it
is impossible to challenge the public perception and the agencies’ actual
legacy of being an integral part of a reactionary, Islamophobic, British
establishment. The reality is a little
different both in terms of the mundaneness of much intelligence work and in the
operational tension between hard-nosed intervention and enlightened
self-interested indulgence. Exposing representatives of the latter to open forums and introductions to members of the Muslim community, especially impressionable students, will create a better sense of inclusiveness, shared goals and accountability, will encourage individual Muslims to engage more, and will undermine extremists claims that are based on inaccessibility of the establishment. |
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Definable
success criteria Presence of
representatives of agencies in public forums such as university union events. Channels through which Muslims are willing to communicate useful
intelligence, analysis, explanations and criticisms and be able to discuss . (By contrast, the ‘Anti-Terrorist Hotline’
is a ‘black box’ – no-one submitting material has any knowledge of how
information submitted is used, whether it is understood in context etc.) Involvement of ‘lay’ Muslims in credibility assessments of
intelligence. Increasing willingness of Muslims to participate in intelligence and
criminal justice activity. |
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Primarily
Responsible
|
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Identifiable
Obstacles Continuing perception of
Muslims collectively as fickle and under suspicion, with conflicting loyalties. |
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Secondary
actions to overcome obstacles Demonstrate self interest
of Muslim community in explaining the threat, through better quality
intelligence assessment. |
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Model None |
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Evidence
of Progress Muslim Contact Unit in
SO12. |
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Summary
of Progress Evidence Sources None |
Identifier 7. Cultivate key figures at grassroots |
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Proposed
Activity Determine ways in which mosques and individual imams can improve their resources e.g. accommodation, training, presentation skills, equipment, library facilities, conference facilities, and grants or loan arrangements to facilitate these. |
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Purpose Better engagement and
mutual understanding. Undermining of case for
extremism. Intellectual capacity-building. |
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Source PPS |
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Rationale Although claims that
extremists have better resources are invariably overstated and merely gripes
about the attractiveness of rival factions, dubbed ‘extremist’ in pique, the
poor quality of all mainstream groups’ presentation and communication skills
and resources cripples their abilities to attract and hold a following. Traditional approaches to dissemination are
also misplaced – formal talks thick on rhetoric and thin on substance, badly
written and unstructured religious texts in a staid and traditional format,
authoritarian assumptions about how knowledge is purveyed (Scholar with
traditional qualification recognised by the host masjid’s faction, declaims
without interruption for one hour, questions are deferentially requesting
advice, not challenging or critical; no counter-view or debate is provided.). English language is used often enough, but
clumsily, with malapropisms, inept examples and references back to
mother-culture not to contemporary society. Masjid and other community
resources rarely include meeting rooms or any presentation or study
facilities beyond shelves of Qur’ans in the masjid itself and low tables fro
traditional madressa teaching to primary school age children. Provision of resources
that enable a more sophisticated and attractive approach is an essential
prerequisite to provision of arguments against extremism. The first task is to show
how ineffective this approach is, the second is to encourage organisers to
have enough confidence to allow open debate. |
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Definable
success criteria Significantly increased
production and distribution of non-factional, inclusive material to a
contemporary, highly accessible standard, using media appropriate to modern
forms of presentation. Significantly increased
numbers of people able to and invited to provide stimulating and entertainingly
accessible contributions to Muslim debate. Diversification of range
of speakers, visitors and events held at masjids, especially among those
nominally committed to a mono-factional concept of the Muslim mainstream. Increasing numbers of
younger and less-formally qualified people leading events and participating
and contributing actively to them. |
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Primarily
Responsible
|
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Identifiable
Obstacles Excessive caution from
existing committees and scholars to preserve the status quo, driven by fear
of opening up control of the masjid to rival factions. Monopolising of material
and resources by exclusive factions. Abuse or waste of funds
provision through neglect, inappropriateness or misappropriation. Being unprepared through
not providing people and material able to utilise the facilities. Objections to allocation
of public resources to what is essentially propagation of a singular
religious entity. |
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Secondary
actions to overcome obstacles Close co-ordination with
other strands of activity required to increase community capacity for communication,
enlightenment and debate, especially (i) grassroots masjid users cultivated
as contacts with the local authority, (ii) activities around increasing
involvement of imams outside of their factions, (iii) production of better
theological material for imams, (iv) production of codes of conduct and other
tools to manage masjids better. Production of an
improvement plan and targets to achieve for each masjid. Collective encouragement
of masjids and Muslim communities to demonstrate what they can and have
achieved with better resources. |
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Model None |
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Evidence
of Progress Islamic Foundation ( |
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Summary
of Progress Evidence Sources None |
Identifier 8. Promote independence of imams and scholars |
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Proposed
Activity Provide access to job skills training and part-time employment that would enable imams to be less dependent on mosque committees for job security. |
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Purpose Normalisation of fringe
activities / isolation of extremist activities. Better engagement and
mutual understanding. |
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Source PPS |
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Rationale Most imams are sympathetic
to attempts to improve engagement, and while many of these are tied closely
to their sponsoring factions, (which are often their alma maters) they appreciate better than their employers (i.e.
masjid committees) the limited differences between most mainstream
factions. Many cultivate and uphold
their sponsoring factions as a survival strategy to ensure that there is a
body of supporters who will ensure their continued employment. If imams are independent of masjid
management they are more able to speak freely and be less cautious about
inviting in a more enlightened audience.
Their speeches may become more politically charged, but that is what
is required to satiate disaffected youngsters who otherwise go away from the
mainstream to find strongly expressed political views. Providing a more
economically benign environment for imams makes the job a lot more attractive
to UK-trained ’ulema. If the benefits
come from jobs outside the masjid, there is less of a problem for management
committees to find scarce funds to pay for imams, whereas merely forcing up
imams’ salaries creates situations where masjids fail to find cheap enough
imams and become vulnerable to volunteers such as Abu Hamza al Masri. |
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Definable
success criteria More successful placements
of Visible followings of and
loyalties to more effective imams, among youth. These imams able to lead their followings
towards more wholesome activity, are more accessible to the authorities and
become role models for less talented imams. |
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Primarily
Responsible
|
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Identifiable
Obstacles The same changes that
enable qualified imams to work more independently of a masjid’s stipend also
enable less appropriate people to be more available for less constructive
involvement in the masjid. Increased frictions
between cautious committees and outspoken imams may cause masjid committees
to obstruct this activity. |
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Secondary
actions to overcome obstacles Target the promotion and
prioritise course placement for those currently or recently working as
imams. Require that candidates show
some evidence of being capable of being employed as regular imams. Moral pressure on committees to provide
better terms and conditions for imams and not to obstruct activities such as
this with zero cost to them. Include
imams’ opportunities for independent incomes with package of other measures
to improve masjid environment. |
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Model None |
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Evidence
of Progress None |
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Summary
of Progress Evidence Sources None |
Identifier 9. English language training |
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Proposed
Activity Provide English-language training that is
geared specifically to their religious subject matter. (PPE) The establishment of a
continuous professional development programmes for the ‘upskilling’ of
current imams and mosque officials in the |
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Purpose Better engagement and
mutual understanding. Undermining of case for
extremism. Intellectual capacity-building. |
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Source PPS PET |
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Rationale Popularly repeated requirement for imams to be able to speak basic English is a mistake. In order to be able to tackle extremism or to be able to give an effective, apt, correct and diplomatic rendition of a Muslim issue, imams must be able to communicate complex and subtle religious points. UK-trained imams cannot do this in ‘Manningham Punjurdu’ nor can overseas-trained imams in ‘night-school English’ or ‘Angrezi-English’. Eloquent mother-tongue scholars are required in community languages, and the particularities of vocabulary and classic rhetoric need to be taught along with the precise significance of religious terms in the context of different religions, to avoid frequent embarrassing and sometimes dangerous misunderstandings. |
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Definable
success criteria Imams are able to articulate
effectively in public debate, interfaith etc.
Foreign imams cease to be
regarded as a problem and are regarded as a necessary, but complementary,
resource. |
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Primarily
Responsible
|
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Identifiable
Obstacles Complacency and inertia of
individual masjids failing to recognise that while they believe they have no
problem, e.g. they employ English-speaking imams or their community is
overwhelmingly mono-culture mother-tongue aware (e.g. many Bangladeshi
masjids), they fail to recognise that the status quo is the problem and that
the solution requires their uninvolved imams to be much more actively
involved. Training as proposed
in the PET document may be perceived
as factionalist – only a small number of organisations have resources
sufficient to undertake training as described and each of these is clearly
identified with a particular e |
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Secondary
actions to overcome obstacles Round-Britain, ecumenical
campaign to raise awareness. Note that
it is the smaller masjids that have least fluent imams (English-speaking or
not) and should be main beneficiaries. |
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Model None |
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Evidence
of Progress None |
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Summary
of Progress Evidence Sources None |
Identifier 10. Religiously objective understanding of radical Islam |
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Proposed
Activity Establish for imams a considered and agreed body of theological material and training in techniques that explicitly address the range of unorthodox doctrines. This does not need to be, and should not be, hostile to unorthodoxy; its purpose is to reduce dependency of newly conscientious Muslims on the opinions of fringe polemicists. |
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Purpose Normalisation of fringe
activities / isolation of extremist activities. Intellectual capacity-building. |
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Source PPS |
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Rationale Almost all ’ulema
(scholars, sing. ’alim) and imams
are trained only in their own factions and polemical points against rival
factions. Most of these are
traditional, orthodox factions (almost always Deobandi and Bareilvi), and
most imams therefore have only the vaguest notions of what the various
radical or militant or even modernist doctrines comprise. Most imams respond to questions on such issues
designed to shut the matter down quickly and assume that the questioner has
sufficient deference to traditional authority to accept simple and specious
(and often plain wrong) responses without further question. The reality is that questioners thereby
have (i)
increased dissatisfaction with orthodox
scholarship (ii)
increased motivation to seek answers from un-moderated
sources, typically through some involvement or dialogue with the faction
being scrutinised (iii)
further evidence of the fractious nature of Muslim
orthodoxy If most mainstream ’ulema
are able and willing to give impartial and objective descriptions of what
each body stands for, in intellectually coherent, objectively stated and
verifiably correct terms, curious youth will not need to go elsewhere and
will have greater respect for the knowledge of the ’alim. When they do go elsewhere and receive
partial information, and factional propaganda, the questioners will be
equipped to challenge it or be able to fall back on the ’alim for
reassurance. |
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Definable
success criteria Production of the required
material, available in the public domain. Use of the same material
by conflicting factions. Willingness of ’ulema to
engage constructively across factional boundaries. Less polemic and more
sophistication among both orthodox and unorthodox claims and debate. |
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Primarily
Responsible
|
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Identifiable
Obstacles Masjid committees employ
’ulema and the committees are (i) protective of their factional interests and
(ii) hostile towards ’ulema who appear not to support them totally. Indeed even now many ’ulema understand
better other groups, at least mainstream ones, than their employers. Therefore masjid committees may obstruct
the work or force it to be ignored. It will be extremely
difficult to achieve common agreement about the detailed history,
achievements and objectives of rival organisations, much more so than a
commonly agreed set of definitions (Item 14
below). |
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Secondary
actions to overcome obstacles Campaign to introduce the
material that makes clear its existence (so people know to ask for it) and
the consensual basis for its objectivity. Include reference to it in
a set of good practice protocols for masjids and campaigning groups to
follow. |
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Model None |
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Evidence
of Progress None |
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Summary
of Progress Evidence Sources None |
Identifier 11. Improve quality of madressa teaching. |
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Proposed
Activity Produce better quality Madressa curricula (accepting differences by faction) supporting materials and training (content, method and pedagogy) to provide it, plus means, e.g. grants, to provide better physical environment and INSET-type links into local schools and teacher-training colleges. Materials and training needs need to be accessible to impoverished and tiny mosques, and to volunteers who provide madressah teaching. |
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Purpose Better engagement and
mutual understanding. Intellectual capacity-building. |
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Source PPS PET |
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Rationale Nearly every masjid runs a
madressa, an after-hours religious school mainly for primary age children (though
the term, literally meaning ‘school’ of any kind, can be used for any age
range). Invariably, madressa teaching
practices are primitive, pedagogy is rigidly traditional and curriculum is
extraordinarily limited in coverage.
The basic target is usually to give children the essentials of salaah
(prayer) and recitation of the Qur’an in Arabic, but not translation. Most children gradually drop out of
madressa around secondary school age.
Madressa teaching never reaches the point where it addresses any of
the religious issues around identity, integration, modern Muslim history or
politics, factional or extremist issues.
When young men and women reach the age where they seek out religious
guidance, the memory of poor quality of delivery leaves almost all of them in
contempt of madressa teaching and the old-fashioned imams and volunteers who
provide it. They are then willingly
influenced by and unequipped to criticise whatever unmanaged, factional and
sometimes extremist doctrines they find in the discreet corner of the mosque,
on the street, on the web or in odd bookshops. For many, especially university students,
there is acute pressure to absorb and respond to such influences. If madressa teachers were equipped with well-designed teaching material, well-structured curricula and modern teaching aids, including language teaching aids; trained in contemporary pedagogy and technique; and provided with comprehensive and accurate Islamic text books, the status of mainstream Islamic teaching would be enhanced sufficiently for young pupils to absorb it and respect it later on. Close links with local schools would result in enhanced value and credit being given to achievement in madressas and the possibility of interlinking children’s work to the betterment of both. |
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Definable
success criteria |
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Primarily
Responsible
|
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Identifiable
Obstacles The most impressively
presented material inevitably comes from the best-funded sources and the
factions they support. These factions
may not be supported by the dominant group in a given masjid and in some
cases may be undesirable per se.
Minority factions may cultivate support among naïve or disinterested
local Muslims, based on superior quality of offering. This will breed resentment on both sides |
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Secondary
actions to overcome obstacles |
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Model None |
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Evidence
of Progress None |
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Summary
of Progress Evidence Sources None |
Identifier 12. |
Proposed
Activity Encourage setting up of Muslim women’s societies in universities, thereby seeding similar groups in local communities. |
Purpose Better engagement and
mutual understanding. Intellectual capacity-building. |
Source PPS |
Rationale |
Definable
success criteria |
Primarily
Responsible Local Muslim community Academic and student
bodies |
Identifiable
Obstacles |
Secondary
actions to overcome obstacles |
Model None |
Evidence
of Progress None |
Summary
of Progress Evidence Sources None |
Identifier 13. |
Proposed
Activity Itinerary of women speakers’ tours and women-only programmes. |
Purpose Better engagement and
mutual understanding. Intellectual capacity-building. |
Source PPS |
Rationale |
Definable
success criteria Recognition by non-Muslims
that Muslim women do contribute and participate directly in Muslim affairs. Recognition by non-Muslims
that women-only activities are valid and appropriate. |
Primarily
Responsible Local Muslim community Local authorities Academic and student
bodies |
Identifiable
Obstacles |
Secondary
actions to overcome obstacles |
Model None |
Evidence
of Progress None |
Summary
of Progress Evidence Sources None |
Identifier |
Proposed
Activity Establish a body of easily accessible literature comparable to that for imams, for explaining factional and unorthodox doctrines and practice to all-comers. |
Purpose Normalisation of fringe
activities / isolation of extremist activities. Undermining of case for
extremism. Intellectual capacity-building. |
Source PPS |
Rationale Currently when every
Muslim faction defines itself, it invariably claims for itself its adherence
to the ‘mainstream’ or the ‘true Islam’ and describes every other group in
terms of deviation from the norm. It
is possible however to make each group define itself in terms of what
distinguishes it from the others, and moderate each definition by requiring
it to be couched in terms that the other factions would also agree are true
for the particular group. Following that step,
training material, publications and tutelage should be made available that
provides imams with the means to explain objectively what rival, unorthodox
or controversial groups actually stand for.
This enhances imams’ reputation for integrity, reduces their
dependency on often destructive polemics, gives them a better basis for
connecting with other factions’ imams, and undermines the role of
unmanageable agitators. |
Definable
success criteria Wide dissemination and
acceptance of the definitions. Increased co-operation
between masjids. Wider spectrum of
representation among umbrella organisations. |
Primarily
Responsible National Muslim organisations |
Identifiable
Obstacles Identifying people with
enough authority in each faction to provide an acceptable definition that
other faction adherents will be content with.
(Most factions are loosely constituted and at every level, authority
among Muslims in the west is thoroughly anarchic). Cautious masjids may still
suppress this information mistaking its intended objectivity for tacit support
of unwanted groups. Factions may suppress the
information, knowing it to be objective, in order to protect their own
interests. |
Secondary
actions to overcome obstacles Campaign to introduce the
material that makes clear its existence (so people know to ask for it) and
the consensual basis for its objectivity. Include reference to it in
a set of good practice protocols for masjids and campaigning groups to
follow. |
Model None |
Evidence
of Progress None |
Summary
of Progress Evidence Sources None |
Identifier 15. |
Proposed
Activity Create formalised links between campus Muslim societies and the nearest mosques outside the university and the university chaplaincy, and set up a measurable programme of activities between them all. |
Purpose Normalisation of fringe
activities / isolation of extremist activities. Better engagement and
mutual understanding. |
Source PPS |
Rationale |
Definable
success criteria |
Primarily
Responsible National Muslim organisations Academic and student
bodies |
Identifiable
Obstacles |
Secondary
actions to overcome obstacles |
Model None |
Evidence
of Progress None |
Summary
of Progress Evidence Sources None |
Identifier 16. |
Proposed
Activity Establish a code of conduct for students running Islamic societies and performing as imams, that (i) is agreed nationally and signed up to locally, and (ii) has a mechanism by which complaints and challenges can be registered. |
Purpose Normalisation of fringe
activities / isolation of extremist activities. Undermining of case for
extremism. |
Source PPS |
Rationale |
Definable
success criteria Healthy stream of
complaints about breaches, enough to show that it works. |
Primarily
Responsible National Muslim organisations Academic and student
bodies |
Identifiable
Obstacles |
Secondary
actions to overcome obstacles |
Model None |
Evidence
of Progress None |
Summary
of Progress Evidence Sources None |
Identifier 17. |
||||||
Proposed
Activity Ensure that universities’ Islamic societies are provided with a good supply of authoritative speakers. |
||||||
Purpose Normalisation of fringe
activities / isolation of extremist activities. Undermining of case for
extremism. |
||||||
Source PPS |
||||||
Rationale |
||||||
Definable
success criteria Rich programmes of events
for Islamic societies, well attended |
||||||
Primarily
Responsible
|
||||||
Identifiable
Obstacles |
||||||
Secondary
actions to overcome obstacles |
||||||
Model None |
||||||
Evidence
of Progress None |
||||||
Summary
of Progress Evidence Sources None |
Identifier 18. |
||||||
Proposed
Activity Provide opportunities for Muslim students to gain access to public figures, to reduce the sense of remoteness and powerlessness, e.g. politicians, diplomats, journalists, figures in security and policing. |
||||||
Purpose Undermining of case for
extremism. Better engagement and
mutual understanding. |
||||||
Source PPS |
||||||
Rationale |
||||||
Definable
success criteria Higher levels of debate,
more young Muslim participation |
||||||
Primarily
Responsible
|
||||||
Identifiable
Obstacles |
||||||
Secondary
actions to overcome obstacles |
||||||
Model None |
||||||
Evidence
of Progress None |
||||||
Summary
of Progress Evidence Sources None |
PPS |
Problems and Practical Solutions to Tackle Extremism and Muslim Youth and Community Issues |
|
25 July 2005 |
PET |
‘Preventing Extremism Together’ Working Groups Report |
Yusuf Islam Lord Nazir Ahmed Baroness Pola Manzila Uddin Inayat Bunglawala Mohammed Abdul Aziz Nahid Majid Abdal Ullah |
October 2005 |
Recommendations from the Engaging With
Young People Working Group. |
Appropriateness |
Relation to my work |
1. Countering extremist ideas – a national, grass-roots-led campaign of events targeted at Muslim youth enabling influential scholars to theologically tackle extremist interpretations of Islam; |
Community, Government funding |
Similar |
|
Community, Government funding |
Similar |
3. Improving service provision for Muslim youth – ensuring the Youth Green Paper is accessible to Muslim youth |
Govt money |
Mine is precise, this is vague |
Recommendations from the Education
Working Group. |
|
|
1. To instil a more faithful reflection of Islam and its civilisation across the entire education system, including the National Curriculum, Further Education, Higher Education and lifelong learning. |
Community authorship, Government agreement and funding |
vapid |
2. To improve the performance and achievement of Muslim pupils by strengthening a wide range of existing initiatives. |
E.g.? |
not relevant |
3. The establishment of a British Muslim-led “National Education Research & Foundation Centre” (NERF Centre). |
Community, Government funding |
Similar |
4. To improve the quality of teaching and learning in RE with an emphasis on life-skills and citizenship. |
Community authorship, Government agreement and funding |
vapid |
Recommendations from the Engaging with
Muslim Women Working Group. |
|
|
1. Dialogue and communication which entails deepening the relationships between Government institutions and Muslim women. |
Community |
vapid |
2. (Building a) National campaign and coalition which entails increasing the visibility of Muslim women and empowering them to become informed and active citizens within society. |
Community |
vapid |
3. Strengthening existing organisations and building links which entails consolidating the good work that is already happening, with a view toward supporting and facilitating its development. |
Community |
vapid |
Recommendation from the Supporting
regional and local initiatives and community actions Working Group. |
|
|
1. Improve data collection on Muslim communities through faith monitoring; |
Govt |
Not relevant to extremist issue |
2. Invest in interfaith work mapping; |
Community |
vapid |
3. Increase the faith confidence and competence of public bodies through secondments and short-term contracts into and out of central, regional and local government agencies; |
Interesting |
XXX |
4. Strengthen the capacity of Muslim voluntary and civic organisations; |
Community, Government funding |
Similar |
5. Support places of worship, including Mosques, to become co-located within community hubs; |
Community, Government funding |
XXX |
6. Link community cohesion and community safety policy strands. |
Govt |
vague |
Recommendations from the Imams training
and accreditation and the role of mosques as a resource for the whole community
Working Group. |
|
|
1.
A new national advisory body/council of mosques and imams. This Body would be
Inclusive and representative of the many traditions practiced in the |
Govt money |
Victim of factionalism |
2. The setting up of a National Resource Unit (NRU) for the development of curricula in madrasah/mosques and Islamic centres. The NRU will also develop programmes and guidelines for the teaching of staff that function within these institutions. The programmes and guidelines will be developed with respect and in compliance with the diversity and schools of thought in the Muslim Community overall. |
Govt money |
factionalist |
3. |
Govt money |
Victim of factionalism Mine is localised and communications based. |
4.
Design a publication that highlights and promotes good practice from amongst
mosques, Islamic centres and imams in the |
Govt money |
factionalist |
Recommendations from the Community
Security – including addressing Islamophobia, increasing confidence in
policing and tackling extremism Working Group |
|
|
1. The Government and the Muslim community to agree Guidelines on appropriate language, and appropriate procedures to ensure that these Guidelines are followed – particularly in times of crises. |
Govt |
vague |
2. The Government must establish and undertake a Public Inquiry into the what, how and why of 7/7 and 21/7 – including an inquiry into the root causes of and the Government’s and other public agencies response to the atrocities. The inquiry should also consider the consequences of the events and impact of measures resulting from the events. |
Agendas of Foreign Policy blame and of Deprivation resources |
|
3. The momentum developed by the Home Office in engaging and consulting the Muslim community through the Taskforce must not be lost. The effort needs to be formalised and professionalized as a means of undertaking the more long term and lasting work. |
Govt money |
Victim of factionalism |
Anti-Terrorism
Provisions - |
|
|
4a. The Government must encourage and empower greater Muslim participation in the various reviews of anti-terrorism provisions and implement the recommendations of these reviews in a more transparent manner. |
True |
problematic |
4b. The Government must consult widely, and particularly the Muslim community, on any further anti-terrorism provisions. |
True |
problematic |
4c.
The |
Govt |
vague |
Addressing
Islamophobia - |
|
|
5a.
Update categories for race monitoring to reflect the race make up of |
Govt |
irrelevant |
5b. Audit all provisions on race and extend to religion and belief wherever appropriate – with particular emphasis on extending to Muslim communities. The audit needs to be undertaken and action plan implemented within specific expeditious timelines. |
Govt |
irrelevant |
6. Establish a Unit at the DCMS, modelled on the Islamic Media Unit at the FCO, to encourage a more balanced representation of Islam and Muslims in the British media, (popular) culture and sports industries. |
Govt |
OK |
7a. Establish a Steering Group chaired by a Minister and including participation from the Muslim community and the relevant industries, to draw up a strategy for the Unit. |
Govt |
irrelevant |
7b. Establish a Steering Group at the DfES, chaired by a Minister and including participation from the Muslim community and other experts, to draw up a strategy on combating Islamophobia through education. |
Community authorship, Government agreement and funding |
vapid |
Increasing
Confidence in Policing |
|
|
8. Pilot Recommendation 5 in the Police Service through ACPO & APA (working with representative organisations from the Muslim community), but with Ministerial oversight, and possibly also through specific monitoring by the HMIC. The piloting should, in particular, focus on key tools for equality (e.g., the positive duty, PSA targets, procurement provisions, etc.) and major areas of equality work (policy impact assessment, reporting and recording of Islamophobic crimes, recruitment, retention, promotion, training and awareness raising, etc.) |
OK |
Mine |
9. Better resourcing for more meaningful engagement and partnership between the Police and Muslim communities – including capacity building in Muslim communities for such engagement and participation. In terms of resourcing, there needs to be a recognition that the Muslim community can provide intellectual and human resources. However, what it may not always be able to do is provide financial resources and skills. This is where Government agencies could help. A good starting point would be to set up and resource Muslim Safety Forums (MSFs) across the country where there are significant concentration of Muslims, which could be co-ordinated by a well resourced national MSF. |
OK |
Mine |
10. A Ministerial level ‘Review’ of the application and impact of anti-terrorism provisions, particularly in terms of raids, stop and search, and armed police policies (eg, shoot to kill policy). Review to be undertaken with Muslim community participation. |
Govt |
irrelevant |
Tackling
Extremism |
|
|
11. Develop a British Muslim Citizenship Toolkit to be used through ‘natural pathways’ in the Muslim community. The Toolkit will articulate a new vision for a British Islam and equip university Islamic Societies, mosques/imams, parents and the youth to deal with violent/fanatic tendencies. |
OK |
Mine |
12.
Develop 10-12 Muslim ‘beacon centres’ around the |
Govt money |
factionalist |
13. Develop a five pronged strategy, to be implemented through the beacon centres, focusing on the following: |
|
|
13a
Leadership – to promote/develop a Muslim leadership appropriate for 21st
century multi-cultural |
OK |
Mine-ish – capacity building |
13b Citizenship – to develop a model of citizenship that reflects peoples multiple identities and allegiances and finds strength in its ability to accommodate each of them and to hold them together. Developing British Muslim citizenship would involve balancing responsibilities as a Muslim towards the world (al-‘aalam) – both humanity and the environment; the Muslim Ummah – the international Muslim community; and the society in which one lives (qawm/dawla). |
OK |
|
13c Equality – to eliminate discrimination against Muslims and promote equality of treatment, opportunities and outcomes between British Muslims and other members of society – through measures stated in section above on addressing Islamophobia. |
Govt – beacon centres??? |
vague |
13d Integration – to develop a model of integration that recognises that our society is constantly changing; that integration is a two-way process between majority and minority cultures; and that places this recognition at the heart of a an evolving national identity towards a Greater Britain. |
vague |
vague |
13e Cohesion – to promote mutual understanding and bonding/relations between Muslims and wider society, |
vague |
vague |
Recommendations from the Tackling
Extremism and Radicalisation Working Group |
|
|
1. Muslim Forum Against Islamophobia and Extremism – an independent initiative to provide a forum for a diverse range of members of the British Muslim community to come together and discuss issues relating to tackling Islamophobia and harmful forms of extremism. |
vague |
vague |
2. Muslim Affairs Media Unit - a special independent Muslim run-initiative with professional Muslim media experts/press officers to provide rapid rebuttal/reaction to extremist (including Islamophobic) sentiments or actions, and maintain a database of Muslim ‘talking heads’ who can speak to the press on a range of issues. |
Community |
OK |
3. British ‘Islam Online’ website - this initiative is envisaged as a ‘one stop shop’ style website/information portal particularly aimed at young British Muslims. It will represent a wide range of views and opinions from all the major Muslim schools of thought, presenting young Muslims with a wide range of choice in terms of views within a mainstream spectrum. |
Govt money |
factionalist, sideline-able |
4. ‘Islamic Way of Life’ exhibition - this would be similar to the ‘Jewish way of Life’ exhibition and would tour schools to help increase understanding about Islam and what British Muslims actually believe and stand for, as part of a wider set of educational initiatives designed to further public understanding of Islam and British Muslims. |
irrelevant |
|