3   Co-ordinated Strategy for PREVENT

This section is still very much under development; please return again for updates or contact the site directly for more information.

Meanwhile, the following are some relevant notes:

Identifier

1.      Conflict-specialist academics

Proposed Activity

Programmes of speakers who are authorities on modern history and ethnography of countries such as Iraq, Palestine, Bosnia, Kosovo. 

Purpose

Undermining of case for extremism. 

Intellectual capacity-building.

Source

PPS

Rationale

Militant idealism provides a simple dichotomy of righteous jihadis against evil imperialists.  Actual picture is invariably more complex.  Better understanding diminishes appeal of militant cause, equips moderates with counter-arguments, does not diminish validity of the cause.

Definable success criteria

Improved standard of debate from Muslim contributors.

Willingness of moderate Muslims to be able to mount cogent head-on debates with those taking a pro-militant position.  (‘Willingness’, not necessarily actual debates – this is a capacity-building measure.)

Seminal relevant articles in Muslim journals.

Primarily Responsible

National Muslim organisations, community and scholarly

to recognise obligations to promote such independent speakers, and then do so

Academic and student bodies

respectively: to provide people and venues; to recognise obligations to promote such independent speakers

Central Govt per se or as enablers

respectively: to provide people and venues; to provide funding

Non-Muslim non-government bodies

to provide people and venues

Identifiable Obstacles

Willingness of authoritative speakers to involve themselves in low-status, high frequency  events.

Willingness of sufficiently active Muslims to accept, receive and digest the authority and content of the learned speakers.

Secondary actions to overcome obstacles

Government funding of fees

University extra-mural organisation

Lecture circuits to include a thousand small masjids

Model

None

Evidence of Progress

None

Summary of Progress Evidence Sources

None

 


 

Identifier

2.      Awareness of third-world issues.

Proposed Activity

More involvement in and information about practical action such as relief work and development aid.

Purpose

Normalisation of fringe activities / isolation of extremist activities.

Undermining of case for extremism. 

Source

PPS

Rationale

Involvement in cross-sector, cross-agency campaigns to alleviate poverty and injustice brings Muslim youth into productive, co-operative relationships with non-Muslims with similar concerns.  Focus on practical issues to address poverty, malnutrition, illiteracy, water shortage, etc challenges the idea that political (Islamic) solutions will solve these problems and posits that they may instead exacerbate the problems caused by strife.  Practical activity to find solutions, is a more fundamental religious virtue.

Definable success criteria

Specific sections of recognised Muslim and non-Muslim charitable aid agencies devoted to this kind of inclusion.

Youth involved in such work willing and equipped to promote it, its material benefits and its value in contrast to the suffering of violent conflict.

Shift towards considered debate amongst youth on poverty and injustice in poorer Muslim countries.

Primarily Responsible

National Muslim community organisations

Charities involved in aid to provide active support and collaborate in setting up, adding capable individuals (volunteers or funded) to their organisational structures;  umbrella groups to promote the schemes.

Academic and student bodies

Provide facilities, support, student time and academic intellectual capacity.

Local authorities

Provide supporting structures around local educational institutions, promotional support, gap-year arrangements.

Central Govt per se and as enablers

Funding agencies’ staffing needs for the additional capability and capacity needed; providing access to and support from DfID and other relevant government departments.

Non-Muslim non-government bodies

Aid agencies and charities involved in aid to provide active support and collaborate in setting up, adding capable individuals (volunteers or funded) to their organisational structures;  umbrella groups to promote the schemes.

Identifiable Obstacles

Resources of Muslim aid agencies are very limited.

Counter-argument that this approach is merely papering over the symptoms, that the fundamental problems lie in un-Islamic political structures.

NB Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen, the Muslim Brotherhood, is hugely engaged in social welfare programmes in Egypt – on the one hand this is seen as a responsible, mature evolution away from violent confrontation, on the other hand it shows linkage between social welfare campaigning and militant extremism.  However it must be recognised that Ikhwan has maturity and real legitimacy in the Egyptian political landscape.

Secondary actions to overcome obstacles

Graduate the programme according to experience and maturity of participants.

Interconnect Government, NGO and Muslim agencies to create a common programme identity.

Model

None

Evidence of Progress

None

Summary of Progress Evidence Sources

None

 


 

Identifier

3.      Practical action against poverty

Proposed Activity

Opportunities for young Muslims to make short trips to Muslim countries under recognised government or Islamic aid programmes, e.g. during university vacations. 

Wider programme to provide extended volunteer programmes along the lines of VSO.

Purpose

Normalisation of fringe activities / isolation of extremist activities.

Undermining of case for extremism. 

Source

PPS

Rationale

Giving youth constructive experiences of the realities of exposure to realities of poverty and deprivation in third-world countries and the opportunity to do practical things to help, will demonstrate the banality and basic materialistic needs of deprived people.  This causes idealistic notions of fighting oppression to be replaced by actual experience of real on-the-ground needs and help.

Definable success criteria

Involvement of Muslim youth in defined programmes of overseas development aid and in its support and campaigning in Britain.

Specific sections of recognised Muslim and non-Muslim charitable aid agencies devoted to this kind of inclusion.

Youth involved in such work willing and equipped to promote it, its material benefits and its value in contrast to the suffering of violent conflict.

Shift towards considered debate amongst youth on poverty and injustice in poorer Muslim countries.

Primarily Responsible

National Muslim community organisations

Charities involved in aid to provide active support and collaborate in setting up, adding capable individuals (volunteers or funded) to their organisational structures;  umbrella groups to promote the schemes.

Local authorities

Provide supporting structures around local educational institutions, promotional support, gap-year arrangements.

Academic and student bodies

Provide facilities, support, student time and academic intellectual capacity.

Central Govt per se and as enablers

Funding agencies’ staffing needs for the additional capability and capacity needed; providing access to and support from DfID and other relevant government departments.

Non-Muslim non-government bodies

Aid agencies and charities involved in aid to provide active support and collaborate in setting up, adding capable individuals (volunteers or funded) to their organisational structures;  umbrella groups to promote the schemes.

Identifiable Obstacles

Resources of Muslim aid agencies are very limited.

The closer such work is to areas of upheaval, the more effective it will be, but the more problematic it will be in terms of personal safety and political controversy.

Secondary actions to overcome obstacles

Graduate the programme to bring it gently closer to areas of upheaval. 

Graduate it according to experience and maturity of participants.

Interconnect Government, NGO and Muslim agencies to create a common programme identity.

Model

US Peace Corps is a poor example in the way it is seen as a soft vehicle of US foreign policy.  However its lack of professionalism compared with European volunteer agencies makes it a more accessible model than VSO or CIIR – it is reasonable to suppose that the calibre of volunteers under this kind of scheme will not be as high as those volunteering under a well-established scheme like VSO, who attract mid-career specialists for example.

Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR) is a useful model that shows (i) involvement of explicitly religious bodies in volunteering (you don’t have to be a Catholic to volunteer for CIIR); sophisticated volunteering programme; continuum across campaigning, volunteering and lobbying.

Evidence of Progress

None

Summary of Progress Evidence Sources

None

 


 

Identifier

4.      Grass Roots Leadership

Proposed Activity

 Steps to involve practical, grass roots Muslims in representing the Muslim community. (PPS)

Opportunities for young British Muslims to be leaders and active citizens – UK Youth Parliament to train Muslim youth MPs to be peer facilitators and run debates/consultations with young Muslims in their local communities.  (PET Recommendation 2)

Purpose

Normalisation of fringe activities / isolation of extremist activities.

Better engagement and mutual understanding.

Intellectual capacity-building.

Source

PPS

PET

Rationale

Muslim community is very self-conscious of its public face, and masjid committees especially so.  Imams, masjid committee members, are invariably naïve and inarticulate.  Community organisation leaders and party politicians are ignorant of practice, of masjids, of youth issues, of Islamic doctrines, and pursue some pretty off-the-wall notions of these.  Involvement of practising, involved, aware Muslims brings them into the limelight where they have to learn to take responsibility for their views and statements.  Involvement of them also creates points of contact around which dialogue can be constructed and wider engagement on both sides achieved.

Definable success criteria

Practising Muslim stereotypes take on positive roles in representing the Muslim community and take over from party apparatchiks, curmudgeonly ‘village’ elders, rich businessmen and other out-of-touch grandees.

Strong debate about whether mosque-attendees or fashion-conscious, street-wise youth are better representatives of the Muslim (religious) community.

Primarily Responsible

Local Muslim communities

This has to be a locally based initiative, but even local Muslim organisations will create obstacles.

NOT National Muslim organisations!![1]

If involved, their members, already active, will squeeze out resources that need to be made available to new talent.  Their surrogate factions will (or will be believed to) control these activities.

Local police

Main contact point between the authorities and recognisable local Muslim institutions.  They can choose with whom to work and therefore cultivate links with new participants.

Local authorities

Not quite as significant as police, but still an important contact point between the authorities and recognisable local Muslim institutions.  They can choose with whom to work and therefore cultivate links with new participants.  Provide introductions to local services.  Provide resources such as meeting places.

Academic and student bodies

Provide time, meeting places, mentoring and encouragement since many participants will be or will have recently been students.

Identifiable Obstacles

Runs counter to the vested interests of all established Muslim community bodies, local and national.

Masjid committees suffocate attempts by people not totally under their control to represent them or use the masjid for meetings etc.

Opening up access to representation, control and influence will open up delicate structures to factional rivalry, instability and potentially exploitation by extremists.

Secondary actions to overcome obstacles

Clear backing of the authorities will put off strongly anti-establishment factions as participants. 

Creation of useful and influential links into local government and policing will encourage old-guard Muslim establishment to give participants influence as they in turn try to co-opt participants into the local Muslim community’s status quo.

Model

None

Evidence of Progress

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/bradford/5149768.stm: Huddersfield Student Shabbir Dastgir, a member of the Muslim Public Affairs Committee, said he had not seen any change in the actions of the community. He said young Muslims must be encouraged to express their discontent through politics. He said Muslim leaders expressed "sincere remorse" in the aftermath of the London bombings. But he added: "Where the failure has been is that the Muslim community has not sat down and looked at itself and said 'Where did we go wrong and how do we take responsibility for what we do to make sure that something like that does not happen again?'  "I have not seen any programme, any initiative, any project in the Islamic community that tries to address this through education and raising awareness.

Summary of Progress Evidence Sources

None

 


 

Identifier

5.      Prominence of converts

Proposed Activity

 Involvement of converts in more prominent roles in the Muslim community, not just special cases already prominent because of their fame.

Purpose

Better engagement and mutual understanding.

Undermining of case for extremism.

Source

PPS

Rationale

Competent converts to Islam have a very important role to play, even though it is obstructed by traditional ethnic communities.  They are free of the distorted view of Western society and ethnocentric views of Muslim society that many first and second generation migrant Muslims have.  They can demonstrate meeting the aspirations of the upcoming generation in taking an active part in society and the workplace without the ethnic community’s collective chip on its shoulder.  And converts could be a visible demonstration to outside militants, terrorists, and racialists and xenophobes too, that Islam has a non-negotiable stake in British society that cannot be undermined by political violence.

Definable success criteria

Recognition of Islam as part of indigenous social fabric.

Acknowledgement of contributions of UK converts from outside UK.

UK converts taking key roles in presenting Islamic issues in public.

Primarily Responsible

Local Muslim community

Must promote converts over the interests and issues of ethnic factions.

National Muslim community and scholarly organisations

Local authorities

Must seek out converts as contact points with local Muslim communities – changing basis or supplementing from ethnicity inclusion to faith-based inclusion

Central Govt per se or as enablers

Identifiable Obstacles

1.                    Many converts are attracted by the radical causes célèbres of militancy – converts’ exuberance, zealousness and lack of a constituency to be responsible to, could be destabilising.

2.                    Presentable neophyte converts are rightly reluctant to take prominent roles.

3.                    Inertia of most Muslim organisations, especially small local masjids, set up as private ethnic not religious resources.

4.                    Ignorance and wariness of converts’ attitudes, leanings and long term commitment among conservative and cautious ethnic communities.

5.                    On account of the point above, the absence of a dependable and faction-free forum or support-base from which converts can have a platform.

Secondary actions to overcome obstacles

Overt encouragement by official bodies, of converts as representatives.

Model

None

Evidence of Progress

3 notable converts on Home Office task force (70 total)

Summary of Progress Evidence Sources

None

 


 

Identifier

6.      Access to the Secret State.

Proposed Activity

Muslim community access to the less well understood instruments of security – demystifying the secret agencies.

Purpose

Better engagement and mutual understanding.

Undermining of case for extremism. 

Source

PPS

Rationale

While SB, CTC, SS, SIS, JTAC etc remain anonymous and mysterious, it is impossible to challenge the public perception and the agencies’ actual legacy of being an integral part of a reactionary, Islamophobic, British establishment.  The reality is a little different both in terms of the mundaneness of much intelligence work and in the operational tension between hard-nosed intervention and enlightened self-interested indulgence.

Exposing representatives of the latter to open forums and introductions to members of the Muslim community, especially impressionable students, will create a better sense of inclusiveness, shared goals and accountability, will encourage individual Muslims to engage more, and will undermine extremists claims that are based on inaccessibility of the establishment.

Definable success criteria

Presence of representatives of agencies in public forums such as university union events.

Channels through which Muslims are willing to communicate useful intelligence, analysis, explanations and criticisms and be able to discuss .  (By contrast, the ‘Anti-Terrorist Hotline’ is a ‘black box’ – no-one submitting material has any knowledge of how information submitted is used, whether it is understood in context etc.)

Involvement of ‘lay’ Muslims in credibility assessments of intelligence.

Increasing willingness of Muslims to participate in intelligence and criminal justice activity.

Primarily Responsible

Central Govt

 

Provide people and access channels

Academic and student bodies

Provide time, meeting places, access to contributors via academic contacts.

Identifiable Obstacles

Continuing perception of Muslims collectively as fickle and under suspicion, with conflicting loyalties.

Secondary actions to overcome obstacles

Demonstrate self interest of Muslim community in explaining the threat, through better quality intelligence assessment.

Model

None

Evidence of Progress

Muslim Contact Unit in SO12.

Summary of Progress Evidence Sources

None

 


 

Identifier

7.      Cultivate key figures at grassroots

Proposed Activity

 Determine ways in which mosques and individual imams can improve their resources e.g. accommodation, training, presentation skills, equipment, library facilities, conference facilities, and grants or loan arrangements to facilitate these.

Purpose

Better engagement and mutual understanding.

Undermining of case for extremism. 

Intellectual capacity-building.

Source

PPS

Rationale

Although claims that extremists have better resources are invariably overstated and merely gripes about the attractiveness of rival factions, dubbed ‘extremist’ in pique, the poor quality of all mainstream groups’ presentation and communication skills and resources cripples their abilities to attract and hold a following.  Traditional approaches to dissemination are also misplaced – formal talks thick on rhetoric and thin on substance, badly written and unstructured religious texts in a staid and traditional format, authoritarian assumptions about how knowledge is purveyed (Scholar with traditional qualification recognised by the host masjid’s faction, declaims without interruption for one hour, questions are deferentially requesting advice, not challenging or critical; no counter-view or debate is provided.).  English language is used often enough, but clumsily, with malapropisms, inept examples and references back to mother-culture not to contemporary society.

 

Masjid and other community resources rarely include meeting rooms or any presentation or study facilities beyond shelves of Qur’ans in the masjid itself and low tables fro traditional madressa teaching to primary school age children.

 

Provision of resources that enable a more sophisticated and attractive approach is an essential prerequisite to provision of arguments against extremism.

 

The first task is to show how ineffective this approach is, the second is to encourage organisers to have enough confidence to allow open debate.

Definable success criteria

Significantly increased production and distribution of non-factional, inclusive material to a contemporary, highly accessible standard, using media appropriate to modern forms of presentation.

Significantly increased numbers of people able to and invited to provide stimulating and entertainingly accessible contributions to Muslim debate.

Diversification of range of speakers, visitors and events held at masjids, especially among those nominally committed to a mono-factional concept of the Muslim mainstream.

Increasing numbers of younger and less-formally qualified people leading events and participating and contributing actively to them.

Primarily Responsible

Local Muslim community

Main instigators and fund raisers

National Muslim community and religious scholarly organisations

Coordinators of funding appeals

Local authorities

Funding and encouragement

Central Govt as enablers

Funding and encouragement

Identifiable Obstacles

Excessive caution from existing committees and scholars to preserve the status quo, driven by fear of opening up control of the masjid to rival factions.

Monopolising of material and resources by exclusive factions.

Abuse or waste of funds provision through neglect, inappropriateness or misappropriation.

Being unprepared through not providing people and material able to utilise the facilities.

Objections to allocation of public resources to what is essentially propagation of a singular religious entity.

Secondary actions to overcome obstacles

Close co-ordination with other strands of activity required to increase community capacity for communication, enlightenment and debate, especially (i) grassroots masjid users cultivated as contacts with the local authority, (ii) activities around increasing involvement of imams outside of their factions, (iii) production of better theological material for imams, (iv) production of codes of conduct and other tools to manage masjids better.

Production of an improvement plan and targets to achieve for each masjid.

Collective encouragement of masjids and Muslim communities to demonstrate what they can and have achieved with better resources.

Model

None

Evidence of Progress

Islamic Foundation (Leicester) and its faction (UK Islamic Mission, Pakistan’s Jamaat Islami) have produced various kinds of printed media for many years.  While much of it is not obviously factional, it chooses examples, illustrations etc that other factions see as exclusive or problematic.

Summary of Progress Evidence Sources

None

 


 

Identifier

8.      Promote independence of imams and scholars

Proposed Activity

Provide access to job skills training and part-time employment that would enable imams to be less dependent on mosque committees for job security.

Purpose

Normalisation of fringe activities / isolation of extremist activities.

Better engagement and mutual understanding.

Source

PPS

Rationale

Most imams are sympathetic to attempts to improve engagement, and while many of these are tied closely to their sponsoring factions, (which are often their alma maters) they appreciate better than their employers (i.e. masjid committees) the limited differences between most mainstream factions.  Many cultivate and uphold their sponsoring factions as a survival strategy to ensure that there is a body of supporters who will ensure their continued employment.  If imams are independent of masjid management they are more able to speak freely and be less cautious about inviting in a more enlightened audience.  Their speeches may become more politically charged, but that is what is required to satiate disaffected youngsters who otherwise go away from the mainstream to find strongly expressed political views.

 

Providing a more economically benign environment for imams makes the job a lot more attractive to UK-trained ’ulema.  If the benefits come from jobs outside the masjid, there is less of a problem for management committees to find scarce funds to pay for imams, whereas merely forcing up imams’ salaries creates situations where masjids fail to find cheap enough imams and become vulnerable to volunteers such as Abu Hamza al Masri.

Definable success criteria

More successful placements of UK imam graduates and longer retention of imams in post.

Visible followings of and loyalties to more effective imams, among youth.  These imams able to lead their followings towards more wholesome activity, are more accessible to the authorities and become role models for less talented imams.

Primarily Responsible

Local Muslim community

Promote and provide openings for part time employment, working skills development and apprenticeships.

Local authorities

Non-Muslim non-government bodies

Academic and student bodies

Provide language, training and re-skilling opportunities, and opportunities for part-time teaching.

Central Govt per se or as enablers

Funding of placements and promotion.

Identifiable Obstacles

The same changes that enable qualified imams to work more independently of a masjid’s stipend also enable less appropriate people to be more available for less constructive involvement in the masjid.

 

Increased frictions between cautious committees and outspoken imams may cause masjid committees to obstruct this activity.

Secondary actions to overcome obstacles

Target the promotion and prioritise course placement for those currently or recently working as imams.  Require that candidates show some evidence of being capable of being employed as regular imams.  Moral pressure on committees to provide better terms and conditions for imams and not to obstruct activities such as this with zero cost to them.  Include imams’ opportunities for independent incomes with package of other measures to improve masjid environment.

Model

None

Evidence of Progress

None

Summary of Progress Evidence Sources

None


 

Identifier

9.      English language training

Proposed Activity

 Provide English-language training that is geared specifically to their religious subject matter.  (PPE)

The establishment of a continuous professional development programmes for the ‘upskilling’ of current imams and mosque officials in the UK.  Theological training to be provided only by specialist Muslim seminaries, Islamic scholars skilled in training imams in the UK and elsewhere for those seeking to pursue further development. (PET)

Purpose

Better engagement and mutual understanding.

Undermining of case for extremism. 

Intellectual capacity-building.

Source

PPS

PET

Rationale

Popularly repeated requirement for imams to be able to speak basic English is a mistake.  In order to be able to tackle extremism or to be able to give an effective, apt, correct and diplomatic rendition of a Muslim issue, imams must be able to communicate complex and subtle religious points.  UK-trained imams cannot do this in ‘Manningham Punjurdu’ nor can overseas-trained imams in ‘night-school English’ or ‘Angrezi-English’.  Eloquent mother-tongue scholars are required in community languages, and the particularities of vocabulary and classic rhetoric need to be taught along with the precise significance of religious terms in the context of different religions, to avoid frequent embarrassing and sometimes dangerous misunderstandings.

Definable success criteria

Imams are able to articulate effectively in public debate, interfaith etc. 

Foreign imams cease to be regarded as a problem and are regarded as a necessary, but complementary, resource.

Primarily Responsible

Local Muslim community

Request services and make imams available.

National Muslim religious scholarly organisations

Define training requirements

Local authorities

Provide courses

Academic and student bodies

Assist in defining requirements and provide courses

Central Govt per se or as enablers

Provide funding and top-down guidance to local authorities and academic bodies.

Identifiable Obstacles

Complacency and inertia of individual masjids failing to recognise that while they believe they have no problem, e.g. they employ English-speaking imams or their community is overwhelmingly mono-culture mother-tongue aware (e.g. many Bangladeshi masjids), they fail to recognise that the status quo is the problem and that the solution requires their uninvolved imams to be much more actively involved.

Training as proposed in  the PET document may be perceived as factionalist – only a small number of organisations have resources sufficient to undertake training as described and each of these is clearly identified with a particular e

Secondary actions to overcome obstacles

Round-Britain, ecumenical campaign to raise awareness.  Note that it is the smaller masjids that have least fluent imams (English-speaking or not) and should be main beneficiaries.

Model

None

Evidence of Progress

None

Summary of Progress Evidence Sources

None


 

Identifier

10.  Religiously objective understanding of radical Islam

Proposed Activity

Establish for imams a considered and agreed body of theological material and training in techniques that explicitly address the range of unorthodox doctrines.  This does not need to be, and should not be, hostile to unorthodoxy; its purpose is to reduce dependency of newly conscientious Muslims on the opinions of fringe polemicists.

Purpose

Normalisation of fringe activities / isolation of extremist activities.

Intellectual capacity-building.

Source

PPS

Rationale

Almost all ’ulema (scholars, sing. ’alim) and imams are trained only in their own factions and polemical points against rival factions.  Most of these are traditional, orthodox factions (almost always Deobandi and Bareilvi), and most imams therefore have only the vaguest notions of what the various radical or militant or even modernist doctrines comprise.  Most imams respond to questions on such issues designed to shut the matter down quickly and assume that the questioner has sufficient deference to traditional authority to accept simple and specious (and often plain wrong) responses without further question.  The reality is that questioners thereby have

(i)                   increased dissatisfaction with orthodox scholarship

(ii)                 increased motivation to seek answers from un-moderated sources, typically through some involvement or dialogue with the faction being scrutinised

(iii)                further evidence of the fractious nature of Muslim orthodoxy

If most mainstream ’ulema are able and willing to give impartial and objective descriptions of what each body stands for, in intellectually coherent, objectively stated and verifiably correct terms, curious youth will not need to go elsewhere and will have greater respect for the knowledge of the ’alim.  When they do go elsewhere and receive partial information, and factional propaganda, the questioners will be equipped to challenge it or be able to fall back on the ’alim for reassurance.

Definable success criteria

Production of the required material, available in the public domain.

Use of the same material by conflicting factions.

Willingness of ’ulema to engage constructively across factional boundaries.

Less polemic and more sophistication among both orthodox and unorthodox claims and debate.

Primarily Responsible

National Muslim religious scholarly organisations

Write, consolidate and mutually agree material.

Academic and student bodies

Identifiable Obstacles

Masjid committees employ ’ulema and the committees are (i) protective of their factional interests and (ii) hostile towards ’ulema who appear not to support them totally.  Indeed even now many ’ulema understand better other groups, at least mainstream ones, than their employers.  Therefore masjid committees may obstruct the work or force it to be ignored.

It will be extremely difficult to achieve common agreement about the detailed history, achievements and objectives of rival organisations, much more so than a commonly agreed set of definitions (Item 14 below).

Secondary actions to overcome obstacles

Campaign to introduce the material that makes clear its existence (so people know to ask for it) and the consensual basis for its objectivity.

Include reference to it in a set of good practice protocols for masjids and campaigning groups to follow.

Model

None

Evidence of Progress

None

Summary of Progress Evidence Sources

None

 


 

Identifier

11.  Improve quality of madressa teaching.

Proposed Activity

Produce better quality Madressa curricula (accepting differences by faction) supporting materials and training (content, method and pedagogy) to provide it, plus means, e.g. grants, to provide better physical environment and INSET-type links into local schools and teacher-training colleges.  Materials and training needs need to be accessible to impoverished and tiny mosques, and to volunteers who provide madressah teaching.

Purpose

Better engagement and mutual understanding.

Intellectual capacity-building.

Source

PPS

PET

Rationale

Nearly every masjid runs a madressa, an after-hours religious school mainly for primary age children (though the term, literally meaning ‘school’ of any kind, can be used for any age range).  Invariably, madressa teaching practices are primitive, pedagogy is rigidly traditional and curriculum is extraordinarily limited in coverage.  The basic target is usually to give children the essentials of salaah (prayer) and recitation of the Qur’an in Arabic, but not translation.  Most children gradually drop out of madressa around secondary school age.  Madressa teaching never reaches the point where it addresses any of the religious issues around identity, integration, modern Muslim history or politics, factional or extremist issues.  When young men and women reach the age where they seek out religious guidance, the memory of poor quality of delivery leaves almost all of them in contempt of madressa teaching and the old-fashioned imams and volunteers who provide it.  They are then willingly influenced by and unequipped to criticise whatever unmanaged, factional and sometimes extremist doctrines they find in the discreet corner of the mosque, on the street, on the web or in odd bookshops.  For many, especially university students, there is acute pressure to absorb and respond to such influences.

If madressa teachers were equipped with well-designed teaching material, well-structured curricula and modern teaching aids, including language teaching aids; trained in contemporary pedagogy and technique; and provided with comprehensive and accurate Islamic text books, the status of mainstream Islamic teaching would be enhanced sufficiently for young pupils to absorb it and respect it later on.  Close links with local schools would result in enhanced value and credit being given to achievement in madressas and the possibility of interlinking children’s work to the betterment of both.

Definable success criteria

 

Primarily Responsible

Local Muslim community

Bring masjids and madressas and their teachers into the programme, raise local funds.

National Muslim organisations

Develop curriculum, syllabi, teaching texts and material.

Local authorities

Interlink local schools, assist in providing materials and finance.

Academic and student bodies

Provide teacher-training skills and training programmes.  Possibly cascade down.  Provide qualifications.

Central Govt per se or as enablers

Funding.

Non-Muslim non-government bodies

Support in kind, funding

Identifiable Obstacles

The most impressively presented material inevitably comes from the best-funded sources and the factions they support.  These factions may not be supported by the dominant group in a given masjid and in some cases may be undesirable per se.  Minority factions may cultivate support among naïve or disinterested local Muslims, based on superior quality of offering.  This will breed resentment on both sides

Secondary actions to overcome obstacles

 

Model

None

Evidence of Progress

None

Summary of Progress Evidence Sources

None

 


 

Identifier

12.   

Proposed Activity

Encourage setting up of Muslim women’s societies in universities, thereby seeding similar groups in local communities.

Purpose

Better engagement and mutual understanding.

Intellectual capacity-building.

Source

PPS

Rationale

 

Definable success criteria

 

Primarily Responsible

Local Muslim community

Academic and student bodies

Identifiable Obstacles

 

Secondary actions to overcome obstacles

 

Model

None

Evidence of Progress

None

Summary of Progress Evidence Sources

None

 


 

Identifier

13.   

Proposed Activity

Itinerary of women speakers’ tours and women-only programmes.

Purpose

Better engagement and mutual understanding.

Intellectual capacity-building.

Source

PPS

Rationale

 

Definable success criteria

Recognition by non-Muslims that Muslim women do contribute and participate directly in Muslim affairs.

Recognition by non-Muslims that women-only activities are valid and appropriate.

Primarily Responsible

Local Muslim community

Local authorities

Academic and student bodies

Identifiable Obstacles

 

Secondary actions to overcome obstacles

 

Model

None

Evidence of Progress

None

Summary of Progress Evidence Sources

None

 


 

Identifier

14.  Explain radical Islam clearly

Proposed Activity

Establish a body of easily accessible literature comparable to that for imams, for explaining factional and unorthodox doctrines and practice to all-comers.

Purpose

Normalisation of fringe activities / isolation of extremist activities.

Undermining of case for extremism. 

Intellectual capacity-building.

Source

PPS

Rationale

Currently when every Muslim faction defines itself, it invariably claims for itself its adherence to the ‘mainstream’ or the ‘true Islam’ and describes every other group in terms of deviation from the norm.  It is possible however to make each group define itself in terms of what distinguishes it from the others, and moderate each definition by requiring it to be couched in terms that the other factions would also agree are true for the particular group.

Following that step, training material, publications and tutelage should be made available that provides imams with the means to explain objectively what rival, unorthodox or controversial groups actually stand for.  This enhances imams’ reputation for integrity, reduces their dependency on often destructive polemics, gives them a better basis for connecting with other factions’ imams, and undermines the role of unmanageable agitators.

Definable success criteria

Wide dissemination and acceptance of the definitions.

Increased co-operation between masjids.

Wider spectrum of representation among umbrella organisations.

Primarily Responsible

National Muslim organisations

Identifiable Obstacles

Identifying people with enough authority in each faction to provide an acceptable definition that other faction adherents will be content with.  (Most factions are loosely constituted and at every level, authority among Muslims in the west is thoroughly anarchic).

Cautious masjids may still suppress this information mistaking its intended objectivity for tacit support of unwanted groups.

Factions may suppress the information, knowing it to be objective, in order to protect their own interests.

Secondary actions to overcome obstacles

Campaign to introduce the material that makes clear its existence (so people know to ask for it) and the consensual basis for its objectivity.

Include reference to it in a set of good practice protocols for masjids and campaigning groups to follow.

Model

None

Evidence of Progress

None

Summary of Progress Evidence Sources

None

 


 

Identifier

15.   

Proposed Activity

Create formalised links between campus Muslim societies and the nearest mosques outside the university and the university chaplaincy, and set up a measurable programme of activities between them all.

Purpose

Normalisation of fringe activities / isolation of extremist activities.

Better engagement and mutual understanding.

Source

PPS

Rationale

 

Definable success criteria

 

Primarily Responsible

National Muslim organisations

Academic and student bodies

Identifiable Obstacles

 

Secondary actions to overcome obstacles

 

Model

None

Evidence of Progress

None

Summary of Progress Evidence Sources

None

 


 

Identifier

16.   

Proposed Activity

Establish a code of conduct for students running Islamic societies and performing as imams, that (i) is agreed nationally and signed up to locally, and (ii) has a mechanism by which complaints and challenges can be registered.

Purpose

Normalisation of fringe activities / isolation of extremist activities.

Undermining of case for extremism. 

Source

PPS

Rationale

 

Definable success criteria

Healthy stream of complaints about breaches, enough to show that it works.

Primarily Responsible

National Muslim organisations

Academic and student bodies

Identifiable Obstacles

 

Secondary actions to overcome obstacles

 

Model

None

Evidence of Progress

None

Summary of Progress Evidence Sources

None

 


 

Identifier

17.   

Proposed Activity

Ensure that universities’ Islamic societies are provided with a good supply of authoritative speakers.

Purpose

Normalisation of fringe activities / isolation of extremist activities.

Undermining of case for extremism. 

Source

PPS

Rationale

 

Definable success criteria

Rich programmes of events for Islamic societies, well attended

Primarily Responsible

Academic and student bodies

Supply of speakers directly, also contacts with other bodies and overseas

Central Govt per se or as enablers

Funding, visas, political support.

Non Muslim Non Govt bodies

Contacts and material assistance.

Identifiable Obstacles

 

Secondary actions to overcome obstacles

 

Model

None

Evidence of Progress

None

Summary of Progress Evidence Sources

None


 

Identifier

18.   

Proposed Activity

Provide opportunities for Muslim students to gain access to public figures, to reduce the sense of remoteness and powerlessness, e.g. politicians, diplomats, journalists, figures in security and policing.

Purpose

Undermining of case for extremism. 

Better engagement and mutual understanding.

Source

PPS

Rationale

 

Definable success criteria

Higher levels of debate, more young Muslim participation

Primarily Responsible

National Muslim organisations

Contacts and material assistance.

Academic and student bodies

Supply of speakers directly, also contacts with other bodies and overseas

Central Govt per se or as enablers

Funding, visas, political support.

Identifiable Obstacles

 

Secondary actions to overcome obstacles

 

Model

None

Evidence of Progress

None

Summary of Progress Evidence Sources

None


 

PPS

 

Problems and Practical Solutions to Tackle Extremism and Muslim Youth and Community Issues

Mehmood Naqshbandi

25 July 2005

PET

‘Preventing Extremism Together’ Working Groups Report

Yusuf Islam

Lord Nazir Ahmed

Baroness Pola Manzila Uddin

Inayat Bunglawala

Mohammed Abdul Aziz

Nahid Majid

Abdal Ullah

 

October 2005

 

 

Recommendations from the Engaging With Young People Working Group.

Appropriateness

Relation to my work

1. Countering extremist ideas – a national, grass-roots-led campaign of events targeted at Muslim youth enabling influential scholars to theologically tackle extremist interpretations of Islam;

Community, Government funding

Similar

 

Community, Government funding

Similar

3. Improving service provision for Muslim youth – ensuring the Youth Green Paper is accessible to Muslim youth

Govt money

Mine is precise, this is vague

Recommendations from the Education Working Group.

 

 

1. To instil a more faithful reflection of Islam and its civilisation across the entire education system, including the National Curriculum, Further Education, Higher Education and lifelong learning.

Community authorship, Government agreement and funding

vapid

2. To improve the performance and achievement of Muslim pupils by strengthening a wide range of existing initiatives.

E.g.?

not relevant

3. The establishment of a British Muslim-led “National Education Research & Foundation Centre” (NERF Centre).

Community, Government funding

Similar

4. To improve the quality of teaching and learning in RE with an emphasis on life-skills and citizenship.

Community authorship, Government agreement and funding

vapid

Recommendations from the Engaging with Muslim Women Working Group.

 

 

1. Dialogue and communication which entails deepening the relationships between Government institutions and Muslim women.

Community

vapid

2. (Building a) National campaign and coalition which entails increasing the visibility of Muslim women and empowering them to become informed and active citizens within society.

Community

vapid

3. Strengthening existing organisations and building links which entails consolidating the good work that is already happening, with a view toward supporting and facilitating its development.

Community

vapid

Recommendation from the Supporting regional and local initiatives and community actions Working Group.

 

 

1. Improve data collection on Muslim communities through faith monitoring;

Govt

Not relevant to extremist issue

2. Invest in interfaith work mapping;

Community

vapid

3. Increase the faith confidence and competence of public bodies through secondments and short-term contracts into and out of central, regional and local government agencies;

Interesting

XXX

4. Strengthen the capacity of Muslim voluntary and civic organisations;

Community, Government funding

Similar

5. Support places of worship, including Mosques, to become co-located within community hubs;

Community, Government funding

XXX

6. Link community cohesion and community safety policy strands.

Govt

vague

Recommendations from the Imams training and accreditation and the role of mosques as a resource for the whole community Working Group.

 

 

1. A new national advisory body/council of mosques and imams. This Body would be Inclusive and representative of the many traditions practiced in the UK, independent and lead by the institutions it serves.

Govt money

Victim of factionalism

2. The setting up of a National Resource Unit (NRU) for the development of curricula in madrasah/mosques and Islamic centres. The NRU will also develop programmes and guidelines for the teaching of staff that function within these institutions. The programmes and guidelines will be developed with respect and in compliance with the diversity and schools of thought in the Muslim Community overall.

Govt money

factionalist

3.

Govt money

Victim of factionalism

Mine is localised and communications based.

4. Design a publication that highlights and promotes good practice from amongst mosques, Islamic centres and imams in the UK

Govt money

factionalist

Recommendations from the Community Security – including addressing Islamophobia, increasing confidence in policing and tackling extremism Working Group

 

 

1. The Government and the Muslim community to agree Guidelines on appropriate language, and appropriate procedures to ensure that these Guidelines are followed – particularly in times of crises.

Govt

vague

2. The Government must establish and undertake a Public Inquiry into the what, how and why of 7/7 and 21/7 – including an inquiry into the root causes of and the Government’s and other public agencies response to the atrocities. The inquiry should also consider the consequences of the events and impact of measures resulting from the events.

Agendas of Foreign Policy blame and of Deprivation resources

 

3. The momentum developed by the Home Office in engaging and consulting the Muslim community through the Taskforce must not be lost. The effort needs to be formalised and professionalized as a means of undertaking the more long term and lasting work.

Govt money

Victim of factionalism

Anti-Terrorism Provisions -

 

 

4a. The Government must encourage and empower greater Muslim participation in the various reviews of anti-terrorism provisions and implement the recommendations of these reviews in a more transparent manner.

True

problematic

4b. The Government must consult widely, and particularly the Muslim community, on any further anti-terrorism provisions.

True

problematic

4c. The UK must lead on and not unilaterally derogate from international principles and standards of human rights.

Govt

vague

Addressing Islamophobia -

 

 

5a. Update categories for race monitoring to reflect the race make up of Britain today and extend all race monitoring to include religion wherever appropriate.

Govt

irrelevant

5b. Audit all provisions on race and extend to religion and belief wherever appropriate – with particular emphasis on extending to Muslim communities. The audit needs to be undertaken and action plan implemented within specific expeditious timelines.

Govt

irrelevant

6. Establish a Unit at the DCMS, modelled on the Islamic Media Unit at the FCO, to encourage a more balanced representation of Islam and Muslims in the British media, (popular) culture and sports industries.

Govt

OK

7a. Establish a Steering Group chaired by a Minister and including participation from the Muslim community and the relevant industries, to draw up a strategy for the Unit.

Govt

irrelevant

7b. Establish a Steering Group at the DfES, chaired by a Minister and including participation from the Muslim community and other experts, to draw up a strategy on combating Islamophobia through education.

Community authorship, Government agreement and funding

vapid

Increasing Confidence in Policing

 

 

8. Pilot Recommendation 5 in the Police Service through ACPO & APA (working with representative organisations from the Muslim community), but with Ministerial oversight, and possibly also through specific monitoring by the HMIC. The piloting should, in particular, focus on key tools for equality (e.g., the positive duty, PSA targets, procurement provisions, etc.) and major areas of equality work (policy impact assessment, reporting and recording of Islamophobic crimes, recruitment, retention, promotion, training and awareness raising, etc.)

OK

Mine

9. Better resourcing for more meaningful engagement and partnership between the Police and Muslim communities – including capacity building in Muslim communities for such engagement and participation. In terms of resourcing, there needs to be a recognition that the Muslim community can provide intellectual and human resources. However, what it may not always be able to do is provide financial resources and skills. This is where Government agencies could help. A good starting point would be to set up and resource Muslim Safety Forums (MSFs) across the country where there are significant concentration of Muslims, which could be co-ordinated by a well resourced national MSF.

OK

Mine

10. A Ministerial level ‘Review’ of the application and impact of anti-terrorism provisions, particularly in terms of raids, stop and search, and armed police policies (eg, shoot to kill policy). Review to be undertaken with Muslim community participation.

Govt

irrelevant

Tackling Extremism

 

 

11. Develop a British Muslim Citizenship Toolkit to be used through ‘natural pathways’ in the Muslim community. The Toolkit will articulate a new vision for a British Islam and equip university Islamic Societies, mosques/imams, parents and the youth to deal with violent/fanatic tendencies.

OK

Mine

12. Develop 10-12 Muslim ‘beacon centres’ around the UK, at the heart of Muslim geographic concentrations that will serve as model centres for smaller mosques, cultural centres, educational facilities, etc. The centres will also provide direct access for Government to the grass roots dynamics of the Muslim community.  Establish a team at the HO/ODPM to consider how these centres can be developed and to deliver the project.

Govt money

factionalist

13. Develop a five pronged strategy, to be implemented through the beacon centres, focusing on the following:

 

 

13a Leadership – to promote/develop a Muslim leadership appropriate for 21st century multi-cultural Britain – this means a leadership not just in terms of a skills set but a leadership capable of rethinking the universal principles and values of Islam for today’s Britain.

OK

Mine-ish – capacity building

13b Citizenship – to develop a model of citizenship that reflects peoples multiple identities and allegiances and finds strength in its ability to accommodate each of them and to hold them together. Developing British Muslim citizenship would involve balancing responsibilities as a Muslim towards the world (al-‘aalam) – both humanity and the environment; the Muslim Ummah – the international Muslim community; and the society in which one lives (qawm/dawla).

OK

 

13c Equality – to eliminate discrimination against Muslims and promote equality of treatment, opportunities and outcomes between British Muslims and other members of society – through measures stated in section above on addressing Islamophobia.

Govt – beacon centres???

vague

13d Integration – to develop a model of integration that recognises that our society is constantly changing; that integration is a two-way process between majority and minority cultures; and that places this recognition at the heart of a an evolving national identity towards a Greater Britain.

vague

vague

13e Cohesion – to promote mutual understanding and bonding/relations between Muslims and wider society,

vague

vague

Recommendations from the Tackling Extremism and Radicalisation Working Group

 

 

1. Muslim Forum Against Islamophobia and Extremism – an independent initiative to provide a forum for a diverse range of members of the British Muslim community to come together and discuss issues relating to tackling Islamophobia and harmful forms of extremism.

vague

vague

2. Muslim Affairs Media Unit - a special independent Muslim run-initiative with professional Muslim media experts/press officers to provide rapid rebuttal/reaction to extremist (including Islamophobic) sentiments or actions, and maintain a database of Muslim ‘talking heads’ who can speak to the press on a range of issues.

Community

OK

3. British ‘Islam Online’ website - this initiative is envisaged as a ‘one stop shop’ style website/information portal particularly aimed at young British Muslims. It will represent a wide range of views and opinions from all the major Muslim schools of thought, presenting young Muslims with a wide range of choice in terms of views within a mainstream spectrum.

Govt money

factionalist, sideline-able

4. ‘Islamic Way of Life’ exhibition - this would be similar to the ‘Jewish way of Life’ exhibition and would tour schools to help increase understanding about Islam and what British Muslims actually believe and stand for, as part of a wider set of educational initiatives designed to further public understanding of Islam and British Muslims.

irrelevant

 

 



[1] They are the problem’s source, not the solution!